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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
RESPONDENT/APPELLEE,
: NOT INCARCERATED
v.
RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS,

Case No.20041118-SC

PETITIONER/APPELLANT.

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this case
originating in Norris' petition for a writ of certiorari.
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
1. Is the communications fraud statute unconstitutionally overbroad on its face?
On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision for correctness,
particularly where the facts are undisputed. See, e.g.. Hansen v. Eyre. 2005 UT 29, ^f 8,
2005 WL1124534 (Utah).
This issue was preserved in the court of appeals. See Norris' opening brief at 1434 and Norris' reply brief at 1-7.
2. Did the district court have jurisdiction over felony charges filed after the
premature issuance of the remittitur in the related misdemeanor case and before the recall
of the premature remittitur?

On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision for correctness,
particularly where the facts are undisputed. See, e.g., Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, f 8,
2005 WL1124534 (Utah).
This issue was preserved in the court of appeals. See Norris' opening brief at 3639, and Norris' reply brief at 12-18.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Pertinent constitutional provisions and statutes are in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
West Valley City charged Norris in the name of the State of Utah in case number
941004929, with four misdemeanor counts of communications fraud (R. 165, 621-22).1
Circuit Judge Watson dismissed the case because the dollar values charged
exceeded his circuit court jurisdiction (R. 32, 36-37, 290, 624-27, 682-684, 698).
West Valley City took an appeal from that dismissal to the Utah Court of Appeals
in case no. 960151-CA (R. 165, 700-702).
While the West Valley City appeal was pending, on September 30, 1996, the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office, acting in the name of the state of Utah, charged Norris in
case number 961020866 with eleven counts of third degree felony communications fraud

*A11 of the informations filed against Norris in these related cases are in the
addendum to this brief.
Counsel for Norris has designated as part of the record on appeal all of the
pleadings files from the related cases. For clarity, however, in this brief, counsel cited
only to the pleadings files in the last case filed, district court case number 971008355.

occurring in May of 1993, based on the same facts as the original West Valley case (R.
49-53, 128, 165, 176-180).
On December 10, 1996, Judge Palmer quashed the charges in case number
961020866 because the West Valley City appeal was still pending (R. 166). He indicated
that he would not hear the case until the West Valley case was completely disposed of (R.
131).
That same day, West Valley moved the court of appeals to dismiss its appeal,
because the State would prosecute the same conduct at issue in the West Valley case, in
new felony charges, but could not do so until the appeal was dismissed (R. 742).
The court dismissed the West Valley appeal on March 26, 1997 (R. 785).
On April 2, 1997, the State re filed ten third degree felony charges against Norris in
case number 971005698 (R. 55-60, 166, 182-87), on the basis of the same facts as the
West Valley case (R. 53, 55-59, R. 1860 at 5-10, 12-13, 20).
On April 11, 1997, Judge Dever dismissed case number 971005698 as well, ruling
that the State could not refile until the remittitur in the West Valley City case issued (R.
34, 166; R. 1860 at 27).
The court of appeals issued the remittitur on May 13, 1997 (R. 208).
Norris moved to recall the remittitur, because the court issued it prematurely (R.
41).
On May 15, 1997, the State again refiled, alleging twenty third degree felony

2

counts in case number 971008355 (R. 12-21, 62-70, 189-199), which were again based on
the same facts as the West Valley case (R. 2-9, 53, R. 1860 at 5-10, 12-13, 20).
At the time that 971008355 was filed, the West Valley case was on appeal, and
case number 971005698 was set for a hearing before Judge Dever on a pending motion
to dismiss with prejudice (R. 1861 at 7-8, 16).
Judge Reese permitted the prosecutors to file this information in 971008355, but
informed them that they could not proceed on it until the remittitur arrived in the West
Valley appeal (R. 156).
On May 22, 1997, Judge Reese denied a motion to dismiss this case after
indicating that the case was not yet his, but that he had agreed to hear Norris' motion to
dismiss it, before there was an initial appearance on the case (R. 1861 at 2, 32). Judge
Reese ruled that if Judge Dever ruled that case number 971005698 was dismissed with or
without prejudice, the new case, 971008355, should be assigned to Judge Dever under
State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) (R. 1861 at 30-32).
On June 30, 1997, the court of appeals recalled the remittitur, upon this Court's
order dated June 26, 1997 (R. 211).
On October 29, 1997, the court of appeals stayed the issuance of the remittitur
pending disposition of Norris's petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court (R. 214).
On November 19, 1997, Judge Dever refused to rule on a motion to dismiss with
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prejudice, and stayed the proceedings pending completion of the appellate proceedings,
because until the remittitur issued from the appellate court, he could not act in the trial
court (R. 166; R. 1864 at 4).
The court of appeals issued the remittitur on October 30, 1998, upon the denial of
Norris5 petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court (R. 124-125).
At a hearing on December 4, 1998 on case no. 971008355, Judge Dever rejected
the argument that the case should be viewed as having been filed after the remittitur
issued, and ruled that the case was filed in May of 1997, and that there was nothing to
prohibit the prosecutors from refiling before the remittitur issued (R. 777, 779). Judge
Dever also denied the challenge to the constitutionality of the communications fraud
statute (R. 773-776).
At the preliminary hearing on February 26, 1999, the State moved to dismiss eight
of the counts because some of the witnesses were not present (R. 146; R. 1866 at 176-77).
After the evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing, trial counsel for
Norris argued, inter alia, that the information in the last case, number 971008355, should
be viewed as having been filed when the remittitur issued in October of 1998, and argued
that the statute of limitations had run (R. 1867 at 210-213). Trial counsel argued that a
case could not be pending simultaneously in two courts by virtue of due process of law
(R. 1868 at 9, 14).
Magistrate Palmer ruled that the date of filing was May 15, 1997 (R. 1868 at 22).
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He found that Norris could not benefit from his own delays, which tolled the statute of
limitations, and that he was not put in jeopardy twice (R. 1868 at 22; R. 232-233). He
ruled that the charges were timely under the statute of limitations (R. 1868 at 22; R. 232233). Magistrate Palmer bound over on the twelve counts (R. 1868 at 37).
The State filed an amended information charging eleven counts, again relying on
the original police report (R. 218-223).
Judge Reese denied Norris' motion to dismiss, ruling that the prosecution's
charges were timely filed, and were properly filed while the West Valley case was on
appeal (R. 1873 at 69-70).
On September 8, 2003, Mr. Norris pled no contest to two class A misdemeanor
counts of attempted communications fraud, reserving his right to appeal the issues of the
constitutionality of the communications fraud statute, and the district court's lack of
jurisdiction (R. 1814-1822).
In Norris' appeal, the court of appeals issued an unpublished memorandum
decision, State v. Norris. 2004 UT App 452, 2004 WL 2749484 (referred to herein as
"unpublished Norris decision"), rejecting Norris' constitutional challenges to the
communications fraud statute, and holding that the district court had jurisdiction over the
case which was filed during the time frame between the date that the remittitur issued
prematurely and was later recalled. Id.
Norris petitioned for a writ of certiorari, and in an order dated April 19, 2005, this

5

Court granted the writ on the following issues:
1. Whether the Communications Fraud Statute is unconstitutionally
overbroad on its face.
2. Whether the district court had jurisdiction over felony charges filed after
remittitur in the related misdemeanor case but before the remittitur was
recalled.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The court of appeals held that it could not revisit the constitutionality of the
communications fraud statute because it was bound by State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267,
97 P.3d 732, a published decision which upheld the constitutionality of the
communications fraud statute. Unpublished Norris opinion at ^f 5 and n.3.
The court of appeals held that the district court obtained jurisdiction when the case
was refiled after the remittitur issued prematurely and before it was recalled, on the theory
that under Chase Manhattan Bank v. Principal Funding Corp., 2004 UT 9, 89 P.3d 109,
the court of appeals' dismissal of the West Valley appeal was self-executing and thus
provided jurisdiction for the refiling of the charges against Norris, regardless of the
recalling of the remittitur. Unpublished Norris opinion atfflf8 and 9.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The communications fraud statute is facially overbroad. Criminal fraud statutes
which impinge on First Amendment activities, as this one does, must be drawn with
narrow specificity, so that constitutionally-protected speech is not chilled by or punished
criminally under an overbroad criminal fraud statute.
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The Utah communications fraud statute is substantially constitutionally overbroad,
because under its plain terms, it makes a second degree felony of any intentional or
recklessly uttered falsehood designed to obtain anything of value, without requiring any
intent to defraud or success in defrauding.
Because the communications fraud statute encompasses a wide array of
communicative conduct which is not fraudulent, but which is constitutionally protected,
such as political satire, political speech, and ordinary interpersonal communication, this
Court should strike it on constitutional grounds.
Under Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Foothills Water Company, 942
P.2d 305 (Utah 1996) (per curiam), the trial court failed to obtain subject matter
jurisdiction over this last case filed (971008355), because the information, which was
signed by the judge and filed before the remittitur issued properly, was void and a nullity.
This Court should correct the court of appeals' misreading of Chase Manhattan
Bank v. Principal Funding Corp., 2004 UT 9, 89 P.3d 109, and resultant incorrect belief
that the court of appeals' dismissal of the West Valley case was self-executing and thus
provided jurisdiction for the refiling of the charges against Norris, regardless of the
recalling of the remittitur. Unpublished Norris opinion at ^ 8 and 9.
As Chase Manhattan itself recognizes, a district court has no jurisdiction until the
remittitur issues properly. See id. atfflf7 and 12 (equating trial court's receipt of
remittitur with "revesting of jurisdiction"); and at Tj 9 ("Remittitur is not an order of the
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appellate court, but merely gives the trial court such jurisdiction as it needs to implement
the appellate court's decision in the matter. Remittitur is a formal revesting of jurisdiction
with the trial court after appellate proceedings^]") (citation omitted).
This Court should also hold that no jurisdiction attached in the case which was
filed after the remittitur issued prematurely and before it was recalled, because the refiling
before multiple district court judges violated the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine, which
prevents co-equal courts from acting simultaneously in one case.
ARGUMENTS
I.
THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE
IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD.
A. THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE
The communications fraud statute, § 76-10-1801, currently provides,
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material
omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by
any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice
is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is
less than $300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is
or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is
or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the
8

property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is
or exceeds $5,000; and
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the
scheme or artifice to defraud is other than the obtaining of
something of monetary value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection
(1) shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things
obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in
Subsection (1) except as provided in Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of
the offense described in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described
in Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or
thing of value is not a necessary element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and
offense of communication fraud.
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to
bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of
information; to talk over; or to transmit information.
(b) Means of communication include but are not
limited to use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio,
television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written
communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted
were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard
for the truth.2

2

The 1990 version of the statute which should have applied to Norris' 1993
offenses was the same as the current version, and differed only in subsection (1), which
then provided,
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material
omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by
any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice
is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing
9

The term "artifice" is not defined by law, but is commonly defined as "false or
insincere behavior" or a "trick," - terms that can be used to describe any form of
dishonesty. See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1983), at page 106.
The word "communicate" is also given the broadest possible definition under the
statute, and subsection (1) of the statute purports to penalize communication "with any
person," without regard to whether one widely published utterance by a defendant might
reach multiple persons and arguably sustain multiple charges, regardless of whether
anyone relied on the utterance.
The phrase "anything of value" is not defined and its application is therefore left to
the eye of the beholder for definition.
The plain language of the statute provides that it is a crime to devise a scheme or
artifice to defraud or to obtain anything of value by means of false pretenses,

obtained or sought to be obtained is $100 or less;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $100 but -does not exceed $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $1,000 but does not exceed
$10,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $10,000 but does not exceed
$100,000;
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value; and
(f) a first degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is $100,000 or more.
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representations, promises, or material omissions, and to communicate directly or
indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the
scheme or artifice. Because of this disjunctive language, there need be no intent to
defraud; a desire to obtain something of value satisfies the statute.3
B. THE RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON OVERBREADTH
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to
freedom of speech and the press.
Article I § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides,
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend
their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship
according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably,
protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the
abuse of that right.
(Emphasis added).
This Court has recognized that the emphasized portion of that provision "[o]n its

Consistent with standard English language usage, Utah courts recognize that when
statutes or rules are phrased in the disjunctive, this requires the selection of only one of
the provisions selection of only one of the provisions joined by the word "or." See, e.g..
State v. Walker. 649 P.2d 16, 17 (Utah 1982)(in finding that incorrect jury instruction was
actually to the defendant's benefit, the Court recognized that the statute at issue, § 76-6404 "requires finding only one of two disjunctives"); In re Babilis. 951 P.2d 207, 215
(Utah 1997)(Court interpreted rule governing disbarment, which is phrased in the
disjunctive, as requiring only one of several findings listed); Berger v. Minnesota Mutual
Life Insurance Company of St. Paul. Minnesota. 723 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1986)(in
interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 31-18-8, the Court recognized that "[t]he statutory
alternatives are stated in the disjunctive, not the conjunctive[,]" and concluded that to
prevail under that statute, a party needed proof of only one of the alternatives listed).
11

face ... protects one's constitutional right to express one's opinion, limited only by the
responsibility for the 'abuse' of that right." West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999,
1015 (Utah 1994).
Article I § 15 of the Utah Constitution provides in relevant part, "No law shall be
passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press." This provision is to
be read in conjunction with Article I § 1, supra, and is deemed "more definitive and
inclusive than the First Amendment [to the United States Constitution]." West v.
Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1017 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted).
The Utah Constitution "reflects the positive attitude of the constitution's drafters
toward a free and uninhibited press." West at 1014.
Language which is strictly opinion is protected by the Utah Constitution. West,
872 P.2d at 1015.4 "'An obvious potential for quashing or muting [free speech] looms
large when [fact finders] attempt to assess the truth of a statement that admits of no
method of verification.'" Id. (citation omitted; brackets by the West Court). '"[I]t is well
understood that editorial writers and commentators frequently resort to the type of caustic

Constitutionally protected opinions are distinguished from actionable fact-bound
statements by analysis of four factors:
(i) the common usage or meaning of the words used; (ii) whether the
statement is capable of being objectively verified as true or false; (iii) the
full context of the statement-for example, the entire article or column-in
which the defamatory statement is made; and (iv) the broader setting in
which the statement appears.
West at 1018.
12

bombast traditionally used in editorial writing to stimulate public reaction.'" Id. at 1020
(citation omitted; brackets by the West Court).
Courts must strictly scrutinize criminal statutes such as the communications fraud
statute, which may impinge upon First Amendment rights, to insure that the laws are
drafted with "narrow specificity" so that such rights have adequate "breathing space."
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). When statutes impinge on fundamental
constitutional rights to free speech and expression, this Court will review them with strict
scrutiny, to determine whether the classifications in the law further a compelling state
interest. See, e ^ , State in re N.R., 967 P.2d 95 L 954 (Utah App. 1998). "'Criminal
statutes must be scrutinized with particular care; those that make unlawful a substantial
amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid even if they also
have legitimate application.'" I.M.L. v. State, 2002 UT 110 at ^j 15, 61 P.3d 1038 (citation
omitted).
Criminal fraud statutes which impinge on First Amendment activities must be
drawn with "narrow specificity" so that constitutionally-protected speech is not chilled or
punished criminally as a byproduct of or direct application of an overbroad criminal fraud
statute. See, Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620
(1980);5 Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 961-62,

5

In Village of Schaumberg, the Court struck on First and Fourteenth Amendment
grounds an ordinance punishing organizations for soliciting charitable contributions if
those organizations used less than 75% of the donations for anything but the charitable
13

965-68 (1984);6 Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina. 487 U.S.
781 (1988).
"In considering whether a statute suffers from overbreadth ca court's first task is to
determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct.'" I.M.L. v. State, at f 15 (citation omitted).
"A statute will be invalidated for overbreadth only if it 'does not aim specifically
at evils within the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its
ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of
speech or the press.'" Provo City v. Whatcott 2000 UT App 86, ^ 8, 1 P.3d 1113 (Utah
Ct. App. 2000).

purpose advertised. The government claimed that the ordinance was valid and necessary
to protect the public from "fraud, crime and annoyance," and the Court agreed that these
were valid interests. See, id. at 636. However, because many legitimate charitable
organizations might use more than 25% of their solicitations for valid purposes other than
direct donations to their identified charitable causes, the Court found that the Constitution
would not permit the government to label such organizations as fraudulent, or to prohibit
them from soliciting funds, id. at 637. The Court held that the government could serve
the interests, but would be required to do so through "narrowly drawn" regulations,
concluding, "'Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect.
Precision of regulation must be the touchstone . . . . ' " Id. at 637, quoting NAACP v.
Button. 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
6

In Munson, the Court recognized that in Schaumberg, the Court struck ordinance
because there was no connection between fraud and much of the constitutionally
protected speech to which the ordinance ostensibly applied, and then struck a similar law
pertaining to charitable solicitation, because there was "no core of easily identifiable and
constitutionally prescribable conduct that the statute prohibits" and thus, the statute
unnecessarily risked the chilling of free speech.
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C. ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE
The communications fraud statute is constitutionally overbroad, because the statute
is not limited to any discrete area of legitimate state control, and does not distinguish
between fact and opinion, and thus portends to punish significant amounts of
constitutionally protected speech. But see, e ^ West supra.
The Utah communications fraud statute is substantially constitutionally overbroad,
because under its plain terms, it makes a second degree felony of any intentional or
recklessly uttered falsehood designed to obtain something of value, without requiring any
intent to defraud or success in defrauding. See id. Thus, it encompasses a wide array of
communicative conduct which is not fraudulent. Compare LaFave, Criminal Law,
Chapter 8, § 90 (discussing fraud and other crimes falling under the rubric of false
pretenses, which normally have the following elements: "(1) a fa^se representation of a
material present or past fact; (2) which causes the victim; (3) to pass title to (4) his
property to the wrongdoer, (5) who (a) knows his representation to be false and (b)
intends thereby to defraud the victim.").
Most false or misleading communications are made to obtain something of value
to the person who utters them. False communications inherently involve a scheme or
artifice, because "artifice" is not specifically defined in the Utah Code, but is commonly
defined in broad terms such as "false or insincere behavior", "an artful stratagem" or
"trick." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1983), at page 106. Under this
15

broad definition, an artifice always underlies any dishonest communication.
Because criminal liability may be imposed when the object of dishonest behavior
is "anything of value," and because intent to defraud is not an essential element, the
applicability of the second degree felony variant of the statute applies to a virtually
limitless array of dishonest statements or behaviors or omissions.
For instance, newspaper columnists Marianne Jennings and Molly Ivins routinely
and intentionally makes bold sarcastic false statements of opinion, as part of their
schemes to obtain something of value - improvements in human behavior and national
politics, or sales of their columns. Because the statute imposes criminal liability for
obtaining anything of value by means of false representations, and does not require proof
of intent to defraud, the columnists' constitutionally-protected political opinions could be
prosecuted as second degree felony counts of communications fraud. Cf. West, supra.
"Puffing" and political commentary are constitutionally protected forms of
communication under both article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution and the First
Amendment of the federal Constitution. See, e.g.. West, supra. Political candidates and
elected government officials often make inaccurate statements or omit material facts with
a reckless disregard for the truth, in pursuit of elections, in justifying wars, or in pursuing
any number of other political agendas. Advertisers often communicate inaccurate
assertions about their products with a reckless disregard for the truth, in an effort to
achieve sales. Under the language of the communications fraud statute, the political and
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commercial communicators are ostensibly subject to criminal liability. Compare Provo
City v. Whatcott 2000 UT App 86, 1 P.3d 1113 (striking telephone harassment statute on
overbreadth grounds, because statute criminalized telephone calls involving lewd or
lascivious language, or made with the "intent to annoy, alarm another, threaten, harass, or
frighten any person ... or recklessly creating a risk thereof").
A woman might lie about her weight in an effort to curry favor with her friends or
to shield herself from embarrassment. Or a man might tell a woman that he is a Democrat
to get a date with her, when he is in fact a Republican. In these scenarios, the offenders
have devised a scheme or artifice to obtain something of value, have communicated for
the purpose of executing the scheme, and ostensibly could be prosecuted as second degree
felons. While the ordinary person would not expect such common falsehoods to result in
second degree felony criminal liability, the plain and exceedingly broad language of the
communications fraud statute grants prosecutors the discretion to prosecute virtually any
dishonesty whatsoever as a second degree felony. But see. State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d
1321, 1324 (Utah 1986)(Howe, J., concurring)(,MIt would certainly be dangerous if the
legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to
courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at
large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of
the government.fff)(citation omitted).
The Utah communications fraud statute applies to many kinds of constitutionally
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protected speech, such as commentary on the functioning of the government,7 political
debate,8 religious speech,9 and all manner of interpersonal communications.10
Because second degree felony liability follows from any false communication,
behavior, or material omission designed to garner "anything of value," the statute sweeps
well beyond any legitimate area of governmental control, and into the realm of free
speech and expression. Compare Provo City v. Whatcott, 2000 UT App 86, 1 P.3d 1113
(striking telephone harassment statute on overbreadth grounds, because statute
criminalized telephone calls involving lewd or lascivious language, or made with the
"intent to annoy, alarm another, threaten, harass, or frighten any person ... or recklessly

7

When government leaders seek to justify a war in with false allegations of
weapons of mass destruction, is this a second degree felony? See, e.g.. Village of
Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (First
Amendment protects "communication of information, the dissemination and propagation
of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes.").
8

When a political candidate falsely promises that she will not raise taxes to garner
votes, is this a second degree felony? See, e.g.. Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (First Amendment protects
"communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas,
and the advocacy of causes.").
9

When a religious leader falsely promises eternal glory to those who will do his
bidding in a holy war, is this a second degree felony? See, e^g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 269 (1981) (religious speech and worship protected speech under First
Amendment).
l0

If a woman falsely pledges to love a man forever in exchange for physical
affection, is this a second degree felony? See, e.g., Provo City v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455,
458 (Utah 1989) (recognizing First Amendment protection of private speech and conduct
between consenting adults).
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creating a risk thereof.").
Because there is no way to construe the communications fraud statute as
constitutional, short of rewriting it or ignoring its plain meaning, the Court should hold
the statute facially invalid regardless of any legitimate application it may have. See,
Provo City v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989). A judicial attempt to rewrite the
law would violate the separation of powers doctrine of Article V § 1 of the Utah
Constitution, and constitute an invasion of the legislative province of lawmaking.
See, e.g., Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263, 266 (Utah App.) (,f[S]ince it is the
judiciary's duty to interpret the law as the legislature has enacted it, not to rewrite the law
as it sees fit, such arguments are better saved for the legislature."), cert, denied, 862 P.2d
1356 (Utah 1993).
D. ERRORS IN THE NORRIS DECISIONS
1. OVERBREADTH
In the unpublished Norris decision, the court of appeals held that it could not
revisit the constitutionality of the communications fraud statute because it was bound by
State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, 97 P.3d 732, a published decision which upheld the
constitutionality of the communications fraud statute. Unpublished Norris opinion at f 5
andn.3.
The published Norris decision is clearly erroneous and should be set aside, because
in finding that the communications fraud statute is not constitutionally overbroad, Norris
relies on New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 and n.19 (1964), for the
proposition that malicious statements made with knowledge or reckless disregard for the
truth are unprotected speech. The court of appeals reasoned that because the
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communications fraud statute requires proof of a similar mens rea, it is not
constitutionally overbroad. See published Norris decision at ^j 11.
Sullivan is a civil libel case involving a public official. Sullivan does not stand for
the proposition propounded by Norris - that all knowing or recklessly-made falsehoods
are constitutionally unprotected speech, see Norris at ^j 11. Rather, Sullivan, which places
the burden on a public official to prove knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the
truth in order to obtain a judgment for libel, is premised on the need for free public debate
on public figures and their political service, and thus sets a high civil burden for public
officials to meet in order to sue someone for libel. See id. In Sullivan, the Court
recognized the value of falsehoods in public debate, id- at 279 and n.19, and "designed a
constitutional privilege intended to free criticism of public officials from the restraints
imposed by the common law of defamation," Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1973).

Sullivan is thus unique to its context of civil libel.

Sullivan is inapposite to this context, which involves a criminal fraud statute which
does not require proof of intent to defraud, but will permit a conviction based on a
falsehood uttered with the intent to obtain anything of value, and thus applies to virtually
all intentionally or recklessly uttered falsehoods, regardless of whether they are
fraudulent, including political speech. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1).
In the published and unpublished Norris decisions, the court of appeals did not
address the argument that criminal fraud statutes which impinge on First Amendment
activities, as the communications fraud statute does, must be drawn with "narrow
specificity" so that constitutionally-protected speech is not chilled or punished criminally
as a byproduct of or direct application of an overbroad criminal fraud statute. See,
Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
In Village of Schaumberg, the Court struck on First and Fourteenth Amendment
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grounds an ordinance punishing organizations for soliciting charitable contributions if
those organizations used less than 75% of the donations for anything but the charitable
purpose advertised. The government claimed that the ordinance was valid and necessary
to protect the public from "fraud, crime and annoyance," and the Court agreed that these
were valid interests. See, id- at 636. However, because many legitimate charitable
organizations might use more than 25% of their solicitations for valid purposes other than
direct donations to their identified charitable causes, the Court found that the constitution
would not permit the government to label such organizations as fraudulent, or to prohibit
them from soliciting funds. Id. at 637. The Court held that the government could serve
the interests, but would be required to do so through "narrowly drawn" regulations,
concluding, "'Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect.
Precision of regulation must be the touchstone . . . . ' " Id. at 637, quoting NAACP v.
Button. 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
Similarly and to a much greater degree, the Utah communications fraud statute
sweeps within its ambit a huge amount of expressive conduct that does not qualify as
fraudulent, see, e ^ , LaFave, supra, and the government's interest in preventing fraud can
and must be met in a far narrower statute than the communications fraud statute.
Compare Village of Schaumberg, supra. See also Secretary of State of Maryland v.
Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 961-62, 965-68 (1984) (noting that Court in
Schaumberg struck ordinance because there was no connection between fraud and much
of the constitutionally protected speech to which the ordinance ostensibly applied, the
Court struck a similar law pertaining to charitable solicitation, because there was "no core
of easily identifiable and constitutionally prescribable conduct that the statute prohibits"
and thus, the statute unnecessarily risked the chilling of free speech); Riley v. National
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina. 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (striking statute similar to
that in Schaumberg and Munson after subjecting it to strict scrutiny and concluding that it
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was not narrowly tailored to the goals of fraud prevention and other related goals in
charitable solicitations).
Because the Utah communications fraud statute has "no core of easily identifiable
and constitutionally proscribable conduct," and thus risks the chilling of free speech, and
because the goal of fraud prevention can easily be attained by far narrower means, this
Court should strike the communications fraud statute on overbreadth grounds. See
Schaumberg, Munson, and Riley, supra.
2. VAGUENESS
The court of appeals' failure to recognize that the communications fraud statute is
overbroad undermines the court's conclusion that the statute is not unconstitutionally
vague, because the latter conclusion is premised on the erroneous conclusion that no
constitutionally protected conduct is proscribed and chilled by the statute, because the
statute requires proof of actual malice and thus comports with New York Times v.
Sullivan, supra, Norns, 2004 UT App 267,fflj11 and 12.
As noted above, Sullivan is inapposite, and the communications fraud statute
applies to all manner of constitutionally protected speech, including political debate,
religious persuasion, and interpersonal communications. See, e.g.. Village of
Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (First
Amendment protects "communication of information, the dissemination and propagation
of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes.").
Accordingly, the communications fraud statute should be carefully reviewed to
assess whether it provides sufficient notice to citizens of criminally proscribed conduct,
see. State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987) (discussing purposes of vagueness
doctrine), and sufficient guidance to police, prosecutors, judges and juries to prevent
subjective and discriminatory enforcement. See, e.g., Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S.
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104, 108-09 (1972) (same).
While this Court did not order briefing on vagueness in this case, in the event that
the Court requests a supplemental brief on that point, counsel for Norris will provide the
same.
3. REFUSAL TO ADDRESS "ANYTHING OF VALUE" LANGUAGE
The court of appeals ruled that Norris was charged with defrauding others of
money, and that this case thus did not provide an opportunity to address the portion of the
communications fraud statute pertaining to defrauding others of "anything of value."
Unpublished Norris opinion at ^[ 5 and n.3.
In fact, all of the many informations filed against Norris alleged that his scheme
was designed to obtain money "or anything of value." See addendum.
Reviewing the evidence at the preliminary hearing confirms that some of Norris's
conduct at issue may have been charged exclusively under the "anything of value"
language, given that the goals of some of his schemes alleged at the preliminary hearing
were to defraud people of their time and effort in working for him without his providing
the terms of employment or compensation described in advertisements or oral
representations.11

u

The State's theory of its case at the preliminary hearing was unclear. In some
instances it seemed to be that Norris was associated with a business named Laroe
International, which hired the alleged victims under pretenses, promulgated in newspaper
advertisements and sometimes by Norris personally, that their job descriptions were
markedly different than the job descriptions contained in various written agreements
which the alleged victims signed. Norris later sued the alleged victims for breaching the
written agreements. See, e.g.. State's Exhibits 2, 3, 6, Defendant's Exhibits 2 and 3
(examples of the agreements); R. 1866 at 8-19 (testimony of Joan Matlson).
In other instances, however, the State's theory seemed to be that Norris failed to
fulfill the terms of the written agreements or oral understandings regarding the alleged
victims' terms of employment. See, e.g., R. 1866 at 146, 1867 at 182-208.
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At the preliminary hearing, Joan Mattson testified that she saw an advertisement
on May 20, 1993, in the Ogden Standard Examiner, and attended an interview which led
her to believe that she could earn a salary and benefits selling a diet product for Laroe
International, and that she was responsible for, but not the purchaser of, the diet product
(R. 1866 at 8-11, 13-14, 32). The job in fact was not a salaried sales position, but was a
multi-level position requiring her to recruit sales people, and the Product Installment
Agreement she signed characterized her as an independent contractor who had purchased
the diet product from Laroe (R. 1866 at 13-14, 19, 32). Mattson decided not to take the
job, did not make any sales presentations and was not paid (R. 1866 at 18). She conceded
that Norris complied with the product return agreement (R. 1866 at 45). Norris later
sued her for $1,200 under the Product Installment Agreement (R. 1866 at 19).
Michael Mabry answered an advertisement in the Salt Lake Tribune to be a sales
manager for a $1,400 a month salary (R. 1866 at 94-95). He met personally with Norris
and did not realize he was committing to being an independent contractor who had
purchased the diet product, and later learned that Norris would not pay the advertised
salary (R. 1866 at 100, 110). He initially testified that he worked for two weeks, but then
testified that he did nothing after the first week because he felt the company was a fraud
(R. 1866 at 99). Norris later sued him for approximately $1200 (R. 1866 at 100, 113).
Kay Lemmon saw an advertisement on April 4, 1993 for a diet counselor position
paying $1,400 salary plus benefits and met twice with Norris (R. 1866 at 115-16). She
believed she was responsible for the product she was to distribute, but did not understand
that she would owe Norris for the product she did not sell (R. 1866 at 126). She claimed
she was unaware that the employment agreement required her to meet a quota of one
hundred and twenty-nine sales presentations a month (R. 1866 at 132). She quit going to
work after about two weeks (R. 1866 at 133). After reading the Product Installment
Agreement, she repeatedly told Norris that she did not have any money to put down on
the diet product, but he told her not to worry, and that they would just keep an inventory
on it (R. 1866 at 117). She tried to return the product and he refused to take it, and later
sued her for $1964 (R. 1866 at 119).
Chris Atkins answered an advertisement for employment as some type of sports
counselor in late May of 1993 (R. 1866 at 138). He came to a group meeting, had an
individual interview, and then a training meeting when he received an inventory of the
product (R. 1866 at 140). He signed a product installment agreement, after Norris told
him it was a substitute for an inventory form that Norris had run out of at the time (R.
1866 at 151). Atkins knew he would have to pay the company if he sold any diet product,
but thought he could return the unsold bottles (R. 1866 at 153). When he demanded
payment of his salary, Norris informed him he would be paid by commission, not salary,
but then never paid him (R. 1866 at 146). He tried to return the product, but Norris would
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Because the "anything of value" language was in fact applied in charging Norris,
the court of appeals erred in refusing to address the constitutionality of that language.
II.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT OBTAIN JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE WHICH WAS FILED WHEN BETWEEN
THE PREMATURE ISSUANCE AND RECALL OF THE REMITTITUR.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-4 (2003) provides, "No person shall be punished for a
public offense until convicted in a court having jurisdiction."
As is detailed in the Statement of the Case, supra, the information in the instant
case was filed after the remittitur issued prematurely and before it was recalled, and thus
before the remittitur properly issued from the appeal stemming from the original
misdemeanor case prosecuted by West Valley City in the name of the State.
not take it, and later sued him for about $2,000 (R. 1866 at 142).
Susan Hunter saw an ad in a Utah County journal for work with nutritional
supplements, paying between $800 and $1,200, depending on the number of hours
worked (R. 1866 at 158-59, 166). She went to a group meeting, and was hired to service
established accounts (R. 1866 at 160-61). She attended training meetings for two weeks,
but after leaving to attend to her family, was never able to contact Norris to begin
working (R. 1866 at 161-62). She signed a sheet regarding the product, but thought it
was just for inventory, and did not understand that she was supposed to sell the product
(R. 1866 at 163). Norris later sued her for around $2,700 (R. 1866 at 164).
Joy Slotsve answered an advertisement in the Salt Lake Tribune in May of 1993
advertising a diet consultant position paying a salary of $1400 a month (R. 1867 at 182).
She met personally with Norris, and someone called her back and she was hired (R. 1867
at 184-85). She believed she would be paid the salary to sell the product (R. 1867 at 185).
She made sales presentations, but was never paid (R. 1867 at 186). She was required to
buy the product as part of her job, and when she tried to return it within the fifteen days
under the contract, Norris refused it (R. 1867 at 186-87). She believed she could return
unopened individual containers, but he would not accept open boxes of sealed individual
containers (R. 1867 at 196). She gave him a check for the portion of the product that was
used, but he refused to cash it and sued her for the full amount (R. 1867 at 188). He sued
her for $2,700, and then sued her for $30,000 for "turning people against him." (R. 1867
at 189, 207-08).
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Before the court of appeals, Norris argued that under Hi-Country Estates
Homeowners Ass'n v. Foothills Water Company, 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996) (per
curiam), infra, the trial court failed to obtain subject matter jurisdiction over this last case
filed, because the information which was filed before the remittitur issued properly was
void and a nullity.
The court of appeals rejected this claim on the theory that under Chase Manhattan
Bank v. Principal Funding Corp., 2004 UT 9, 89 P.3d 109, the court of appeals' dismissal
of the West Valley case was self-executing and thus provided jurisdiction for the refiling
of the charges against Norris, regardless of the recalling of the remittitur. Unpublished
Norris opinion at ^ 8 and 9.
By reviewing Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Foothills Water Company,
942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996) (per curiam), this Court can confirm that the trial court failed
to obtain subject matter jurisdiction over this last case filed, because the information
which was filed before the remittitur issued properly was void and a nullity.
In Hi-Country, a trial court modified its judgment in accordance with an appellate
decision from the court of appeals, before this Court disposed of a petition for a writ of
certiorari. See id., at 305-06. The Court addressed several related jurisdictional issues,
beginning with the premise that a trial court does not have jurisdiction over a case which
is pending on appeal. Id. at 306. The Court noted that the court of appeals issuance of
the remittitur before the certiorari petition was filed did not vest jurisdiction in the trial
court, because the remittitur was premature and should not have issued until the
expiration of time for filing a petition for certiorari. Id. The Court explained that if
proceedings may occur simultaneously in different courts in one case, this disserves
judicial economy and renders the case a "proverbial 'moving target.'" Id. at 307.
The Court concluded by vacating the modified judgment of the trial court, finding
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that it was entered when the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and was void.
Id.
In the instant matter, West Valley City, acting in the name of the State of Utah,
originally prosecuted this case as misdemeanors, and then appealed when Circuit Judge
Watson dismissed it because he interpreted the communications fraud statute as requiring
felony charges in this case, which at that time, belonged in district, not circuit court.
Despite the ongoing proceedings in the court of appeals, then this Court, and then
the United States Supreme Court in this very case, the State repeatedly refiled the charges
before the remittitur properly issued, and before the lower courts could properly obtain
subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Norris. See Hi-Country, supra.
Because the district courts had no jurisdiction when the case was before the
appellate courts, see, High-Country, the informations filed in those courts are null and
void. See, e ^ , Transworld Systems Inc. v. Robison, 796 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah 1990)
(proceedings conducted without jurisdiction are nullities and void).
The court of appeals misread Chase Manhattan Bank v. Principal Funding Corp.,
2004 UT 9, 89 P.3d 109, and consequently harbored the incorrect belief that the court of
appeals' dismissal of the West Valley case was self-executing and thus provided
jurisdiction for the refiling of the charges against Norris, regardless of the recalling of the
remittitur. Unpublished Norris opinion at ^ 8 and 9.
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As Chase Manhattan itself recognizes, a district court has no jurisdiction until the
remittitur issues properly. See id. atffi[7 and 12 (equating trial court's receipt of
remittitur with "revesting of jurisdiction"); and at f 9 ("Remittitur is not an order of the
appellate court, but merely gives the trial court such jurisdiction as it needs to implement
the appellate court's decision in the matter. Remittitur is a formal revesting of jurisdiction
with the trial court after appellate proceedings[.]") (citation omitted).
As Hi-Country demonstrates, when a remittitur issues prematurely, all actions of a
trial court are nullities. See idThe court of appeals did not address Norris' argument that the refiling before
multiple district court judges violated the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine.
At the time that 971008355 was filed, the West Valley case was on appeal, and
case number 971005698 was set for a hearing before Judge Dever on a pending motion
to dismiss with prejudice (R. 1861 at 7-8, 16). The filing of the successive prosecutions
violated the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine, which prevents co-equal courts from acting
simultaneously in one case. This doctrine has governed in this state for years. As the
Court explained in Escalante Co. v. Kent, 7 P.2d 276 (Utah 1932),
"Where two actions between the same parties, on the same subject, and to
test the same rights, are brought in different courts having concurrent
jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction, its power being
adequate to the administration of complete justice, retains its jurisdiction
and may dispose of the whole controversy, and no court of coordinate
power is at liberty to interfere with its action. This rule rests upon comity
and the necessity of avoiding conflict in the execution of judgments by
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independent courts, and is a necessary one because any other rule would
unavoidably lead to perpetual collision and be productive of most
calamitous results."
Id. at 278 (citation omitted).
The convoluted procedural history of this case, and Mr. Norris' experiences in
having been repeatedly charged, arrested and hailed before so many different courts to
answer so many different charges and theories premised on the same underlying facts,
prove the validity of, and the importance of complying with, the concurrent jurisdiction
doctrine. See M. See, also, $&, Nielson v. Schiller, 66 P.2d 365, 366 (Utah 1937)
(refiling elements of case in one court while other elements are pending in another court
of concurrent jurisdiction "is abhorrent to the orderly procedure and determination of
causes in courts of concurrent jurisdiction and cannot do other than inject confusion into
the orderly procedure of the courts.").
Because the district court never had proper jurisdiction over Mr. Norris, this Court
should order his case dismissed.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision, and hold that the
communications fraud statute is constitutionally overbroad and that the district court
failed to obtain jurisdiction over this case, which was filed between the premature
issuance and recall of the remittitur.
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Respectfully submitted on June 2, 2005.

Eliiabelh Hur

i
Attorney for Mr. Norris
Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing to Assistant
Attorney General Kris Leonard, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114-0854, on June 2, 2005.
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM CONTENTS
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

UNPUBLISHED NORRIS DECISION

PUBLISHED NORRIS DECISION

INFORMATIONS

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Constitution of Utah, Article I § 1
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and
liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of
their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for
the abuse of that right.
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 15
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press. In all
criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it
shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with
good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have
the right to determine the law and the fact.
Constitution of Utah, Article V § 1
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed
or permitted.
Constitution of Utah, Article VI § 1
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in:
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the Legislature of
the State of Utah; and
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2).
(2) (a) (i) The legal voters of the State of Utah in the numbers, under the conditions, in
the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may:
(A) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people for adoption
upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as provided by statute; or
(B) require any law passed by the Legislature, except those laws passed by a two-thirds
vote of the members elected to each house of the Legislature, to be submitted to the
voters of the State, as provided by statute, before the law may take effect.
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a)(i)(A), legislation initiated to allow, limit, or
prohibit the taking of wildlife or the season for or method of taking wildlife shall be
adopted upon approval of two-thirds of those voting.
(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the numbers, under the conditions, in
the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may:

(i) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people of the county,
city, or town for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as
provided by statute; or
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of the county, city, or
town to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided by statute, before the law or
ordinance may take effect.
United States Constitution, Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1990)
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain
from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates
directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is $100 or less;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is more than $100 but -does not exceed $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is more than $1,000 but does not exceed $10,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is more than $10,000 but does not exceed $100,000;
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud is other
than the obtaining of something of monetary value; and

(f) a first degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is $100,000 or more.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be
obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as provided in
Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense described
in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1) to
permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary
element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of
communication fraud.
(6)(a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, make
known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit information,
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, telephone,
telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1995)
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain
from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates
directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is less than $300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud is other
than the obtaining of something of monetary value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be
obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as provided in

Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense described
in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1) to
permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary
element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of
communication fraud.
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, make
known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit information,
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, telephone,
telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-4 (2003)
No person shall be punished for a public offense until convicted in a court having
jurisdiction.

UNPUBLISHED NORRIS DECISION

2004 WL 2749484 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 452
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Richard F. NORRIS, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20030817-CA.
Dec. 2, 2004.
Third District, Salt Lake Department; The Honorable Robin W. Reese.
Elizabeth H u n t Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L, Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BILLINGS. BENCH, and JACKSON.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official Publication)
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
[1] Defendant Richard F. Norris appeals his conviction of attempted communications
fraud. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4401 to 76404801 (1997). We affirm.
In December 1994, West Valley City (West Valley) charged Defendant with four
misdemeanor counts of communications fraud in the Third Circuit Court, West Valley
Department. J F N l l See Utah Code Ann, § 76-10-1801(1) (1994). In February 1996, the
circuit court dismissed the misdemeanor charges, ruling that the aggregate of the four
misdemeanor counts exceeded the circuit court's jurisdictional limit of $1000.00. West
Valley appealed the circuit court's decision.
FN1. Circuit courts merged into district courts on July 1,1996. See Utah Code
Ann, § 784-2 (1997).

[2] On December 10,1996, because the State was prepared to file felony counts of
communications fraud against Defendant in district court, West Valley moved this court

to dismiss its appeal. On March 26, 1997, this court dismissed the appeal, and on May 13,
1997, this court issued a remittitur. Two days later, the State filed twenty felony charges
of communications fraud against Defendant in district court.
[3] Defendant moved to recall the remittitur on the ground that it had been issued
prematurely because Defendant's time to file a petition for certiorari had not expired. On
June 26, 1997, the Utah Supreme Court ordered this court to recall the remittitur, which
this court did on June 30, 1997. On September 26, 1997, Defendant moved the district
court to dismiss the felony charges because the West Valley case was still active. The
district court did not dismiss the charges, but rather stayed its proceedings until all
activity in the West Valley appeal had ceased.
[4] After Defendant's petitions for certiorari had been denied in both the Utah Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court, this court reissued the remittitur on October
30, 1998. Defendant then moved the district court to dismiss the felony charges, claiming
that (i) the communications fraud statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and
(ii) the district court lacked jurisdiction over the May 1997 felony charges because the
May 1997 remittitur was subsequently recalled. The district court denied the motions.
Defendant then entered a conditional plea in which Defendant preserved his right to
challenge the constitutionality of the communications fraud statute and the jurisdiction of
the district court to hear the felony charges filed in May 1997. Defendant appeals these
two issues. [FN21
FN2, Defendant attempts to raise numerous other issues in his briefs. We do not
address these issues because they exceed the scope of what was preserved in the
conditional plea. Defendant mentions plain error in a single paragraph, but fails to
apply plain error doctrine to any of the specific issues raised. Thus, we do not
address Defendant's plain error argument because it is inadequately briefed. See
Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(5)(B) ("The brief of the appellant shall contain ... a
statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court.").
[5] Defendant argues that the statute under which he was charged is unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad. However, after this appeal was filed, this court addressed these
specific challenges. See State v. Morris. 2004 UT App 267,ff 8-16, 97 P 3 d 732 (holding
that the communications fraud statute is neither unconstitutionally overbroad nor
unconstitutionally vague). Thus, Defendant's constitutional challenges to the
communications fraud statute fail. [FN3]
FN3, Defendant claims that our prior decision did not directly deal with the phrase

"anything of value," and thus we are free to hold that the statute is
unconstitutionally vague on that basis. However, our prior decision did hold that
"because Defendant was charged with devising a scheme to defraud others of
money, his actions do not fall within the anything of value realm, and thus, he may
not challenge this phrase as unconstitutionally vague." State y. Nam's. 2004 UT
App 267,f 15, 97 P.3d 732 (quotations and citations omitted). In this case,
Defendant also was charged with devising a scheme to defraud others of money,
and thus under the rule articulated in Norris, Defendant also may not challenge this
phrase as unconstitutionally vague in this case. See id.
In addition, Defendant's challenge to the State charging multiple counts when one
communication reaches numerous victims already has been decided by this court.
See State v. Bradshaw. 2004 UT App 298, 99 P J d 359.
[6] Defendant also challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the felony charges
filed in May 1997. Specifically, Defendant argues that even though this court had issued a
remittitur in the West Valley appeal before the felony charges were filed, the remittitur
had no effect because it was subsequently recalled. We disagree.
[7] "The determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of
law, which we review for correctness, according no deference to the district court's
determination." Beaver County v. Qwest Inc.* 2001 UT 81,f 8, 31 P J d 1147. The issue
in this case is whether a valid order dismissing the misdemeanor charges in the West
Valley case existed at the time felony charges were filed. The parties focus their
arguments on Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass fn. v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d
305 (Utah 1996), which held that actions taken by a trial court after a remittitur issues are
void if the remittitur is subsequently recalled. See id. at 307. Hi-Country, however, does
not control the outcome of this case.
[8] The controlling case is Chase Manhattan Bank v. Principal Funding Corp., 2004
UT 9,89 P J d 109. [FN4] In Chase Manhattan, the court outlined the situations in which
judgments by appellate courts are self-executing. See id. at ^f 11. The court concluded
that, under the 1997 version of rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
where "the trial court need not act for a valid order to be found in the record," the
judgment is self-executing unless a party specifically requests and is granted a stay of the
remittitur before it issues. [FN5] Id. at f 12. Specifically, the court held that if a judgment
by this court is self-executing, then a valid order exists on the record from the moment the
remittitur is issued until it is subsequently recalled. See id. at Tf 7.
FN4 The State cites Nielson v. Schiller, 92 Utah 137, 66 P.2d 365 (1937), a civil
case, for the proposition that a second-filed action should be stayed until the firstfiled action has been resolved. See id. at 368, Because that case did not involve a
remittitur, or even an appeal, it does not speak directly to the jurisdictional issue in

this case. Rather, it merely indicates that in this case it was proper for the district
court to issue a stay once it was aware that the appeal had been resuscitated.
FN5, The current rule avoids the odd situation in this case by providing that a
remittitur issues immediately after the time for filing a petition for certiorari has
expired, unless such a petition is filed, in which case the remittitur is automatically
stayed. See Utah R.App. P. 36(a)(2).

[9] In the West Valley appeal, acting on a motion by the appellant, this court dismissed
the appeal. Dismissal of the West Valley appeal required no further action by the circuit
court, but rather left in place the circuit court's ruling that dismissed the misdemeanor
charges without prejudice. Thus, when the State filed felony charges in district court two
days after this court issued a remittitur, no further action was required in the West Valley
case. Therefore, a valid judgment existed on the record when felony charges were filed.
The subsequent recall of the remittitur on Defendant's motion did not change this fact. See
id. at ^ 12-13. For this reason, the district court did not lack jurisdiction when charges
were filed in this case. [FN6] Therefore, we affirm.
FN6» Defendant claims that his due process rights were violated when

the State vindictively prosecuted the felony case against him, and thus under
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), the due process violations strip the
district court ofjurisdiction. However, unlike in Blackledge, the record in this case
does not indicate a "realistic likelihood of Vindictiveness,1" id. at 27, because (i)
the original trial court dismissed the misdemeanor charges sua sponte, (ii) the
appeal was taken by West Valley, not the Defendant, (iii) the State indicated its
intention to file felony charges prior to Defendant asking the Utah Supreme Court
to recall the appeal, and (iv) the State had a legitimate reason to file felony charges
when it did, namely concern over the statute of limitations. While the State's
actions in this case were less than ideal, the record does not come close to
establishing prosecutorial vindictiveness in response to Defendant exercising his
procedural rights on appeal.

WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge and NORMAN i i
JACKSON, Judge.
UtahApp.,2004.

PUBLISHED NORRIS DECISION

Westlaw
Page 1

97P.3d732
97 P.3d 732, 506 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 U T App 267
(Cite as: 97 P.3d 732, 2004 U T App 267)

Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Richard NORRIS, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20020966-CA.
Aug. 12, 2004.
Background: Defendant was convicted on his
unconditional pleas of guilty in the Fourth District
Court, Provo Department, James R. Taylor, J., of three
counts of communications fraud, and he appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, James Z. Davis, J.,
held that:
(1) defendant's unconditional guilty plea to
communications fraud did not operate as waiver of his
facial constitutional challenge to communications fraud
statute;
(2) communications fraud statute was not
unconstitutionally overbroad;
(3) term "artifice" as used in communications fraud
statute was not unconstitutionally vague; and
(4) term "communicate" as used in communications
fraud statute, was not unconstitutionally vague.
Affirmed.
Gregory K. Orme, J., filed concurring opinion.
Russell W. Bench, Associate P.J., filed opinion
concurring in result.
West Headnotes
HI Criminal Law €^>1134(3)
110k! 134(3) Most Cited Cases
The determination of whether a court has subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law, which an appellate
court reviews for correctness.
12] Criminal Law €=>1134(3)
110k! 134(3) Most Cited Cases

Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions
of law, which the appellate court reviews for
correctness.
131 Constitutional Law €=^48(1)
92k48(l) Most Cited Cases
131 Constitutional Law €^>48(3)
92k48(3) Most Cited Cases
When addressing a challenge to the constitutionality of
a statute, the appellate court presumes that the statute is
valid and resolves any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality.
141 Criminal Law €^>273.4(1)
110k273.4(l) Most Cited Cases
Defendant's unconditional guilty plea to
communications fraud did not operate as waiver of his
facial constitutional challenge to communications fraud
statute, as such challenge was jurisdictional in nature;
defendant's facial challenge to constitutionality of
statute directly cut to power and authority of court to
determine a controversy, and thus was necessarily a
jurisdictional matter. U.C.A.1953, 76-10-1801.
151 Criminal Law €=^273.3
110k273.3 Most Cited Cases
151 Criminal Law €=^>273.4(1)
110k273.4(l) Most Cited Cases
The general rule applicable in criminal proceedings is
that by pleading guilty, defendant is deemed to have
admitted all of the essential elements of the crime
charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional
defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional
violations.
161 Courts € ^ 4
106k4 Most Cited Cases
"Subject matter jurisdiction" is the power and authority
of the court to determine a controversy and without
which it cannot proceed.
121 Criminal Law €^>105

© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

97P.3d732
97 P.3d 732, 506 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 UT App 267
(Cite as: 97 P.3d 732, 2004 UT App 267)

110kl05 Most Cited Cases
Subject matter jurisdiction can neither be waived nor
conferred by consent of the accused in a criminal
proceeding; objection to the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter may be urged at any stage of the
proceedings, and the right to make such an objection is
never waived.
181 Criminal Law €^>1017
110kl017 Most Cited Cases
When subject matter jurisdiction is an issue, it is the
duty of the appellate court to satisfy itself not only of its
own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a
cause under review.
121 Criminal Law €^>273.4(1)
110k273.4(l) Most Cited Cases
121 Criminal Law €^1026.10(4)
110k!026.10(4) Most Cited Cases
In general, a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional
defects, but does not bar appeal of claims that the
applicable statute is unconstitutional or that the
indictment fails to state an offense.
1101 Criminal Law € ^ 2 7 3 . 4 ( 1 )
110k273.4(l) Most Cited Cases
[101 Criminal Law €^1026.10(4)
110k!026.10(4) Most Cited Cases
Although a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional
defects and fact issues, a vagueness challenge to a
statute is a jurisdictional defect thus, following a guilty
plea, defendant could raise on appeal that he was
prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute.
[Ill Criminal Law €=>13(1)
110kl3(l) Most Cited Cases
In considering whether a statute is overbroad, a court's
first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches
a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
conduct.
[121 Criminal Law €=>13(1)
110kl3(l) Most Cited Cases
Courts examine criminal statutes with particular care;
those that make unlawful a substantial amount of

Page 2

constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially
invalid even if they also have legitimate application.
[131 Criminal Law €=>13(1)
110k 13(1) Most Cited Cases
Only a statute that is substantially overbroad may be
invalidated on its face; overbreadth must not only be
real, but substantial as well
[14! False Pretenses C==>2
170k2 Most Cited Cases
[141 Fraud €^>68
184k68 Most Cited Cases
Communications fraud statute, which prohibited
devising any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to
obtain from another money, property, or anything of
value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions, was
not unconstitutionally overbroad; statute did not
prohibit all false pretenses, representations, promises,
or material omissions, only those where individual
sought to defraud another or to obtain from another
money, property, or anything of value, and statute
required proof that false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions made
or omitted were made or omitted intentionally,
knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.
U.C.A.1953, 76-10-1801(1, 7).
[151 Statutes €^>188
361kl88 Most Cited Cases
[151 Statutes €^>212.6
361k212.6 Most Cited Cases
When interpreting the challenged language of a statute,
courts look to the statute's plain language and presume
that the legislature used each term advisedly.
[161 Criminal Law € ^ 1 3 ( 1 )
110kl3(l) Most Cited Cases
Statutory language is overbroad if its language
proscribes both harmful and innocuous behavior.
[171 Constitutional Law €^>90(3)
92k90(3) Most Cited Cases
While the First Amendment may value some falsehoods

© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Page 3

97P.3d732
97 P.3d 732, 506 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 UT App 267
(Cite as: 97 P.3d 732, 2004 UT App 267)

for their contribution to public debate, it has not given
protection to malicious statements that were made with
knowledge that they were false or with reckless
disregard of whether they were false or not. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 1.
1181 Criminal Law €=^13.1(1)
110kl3.1(l) Most Cited Cases
The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute
or ordinance define an offense with sufficient
defmiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
[191 Criminal Law € ^ 1 3 . 1 ( 1 )
110kl3.1(l) Most Cited Cases
If a statute challenged on vagueness grounds implicates
no constitutionally protected conduct, individual
challenging statute must show that the statute is
impermissibly vague in all of its applications.
1201 False Pretenses €^>2
170k2 Most Cited Cases
1201 Fraud C^>68
184k68 Most Cited Cases
Term "artifice" as used in communications fraud
statute, which prohibited devising any scheme or
artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another
money, property, or anything of value by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or
material omissions, was not unconstitutionally vague;
"artifice" was commonly understood to mean "an artful
stratagem," or a "trick," statute did not prohibit all
stratagems or tricks, only those meant to defraud others,
and while the term "artifice" could be construed
broadly, this, in itself, did not render statute vague.
U.C.A.1953. 76-10-1801(1).
1211 Statutes €^>208
361k208 Most Cited Cases
Courts, in construing a statute, do not read a statutory
term in a vacuum, but, rather as the term relates to the
other terms within the statute.
[221 Criminal Law €^>13.1(1)
110k 13.If 1) Most Cited Cases

A statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it is
broad.
[231 False Pretenses €^>2
170k2 Most Cited Cases
Term "communicate" as used in communications fraud
statute, which prohibited communicating directly or
indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose
of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice, was
not unconstitutionally vague; although the term
"communicate" was broadly defined in statute, this, in
itself, did not render term vague, statute did not seek to
punish those who kept artifice or scheme to themselves,
and there had been no showing that ordinary people
could not understand what conduct was prohibited.
U.C.A.1953, 76-10-1801(1), (6)(a).
[241 False Pretenses €^>2
170k2 Most Cited Cases
Conduct for which defendant was charged under
communications fraud statute, which was devising
scheme to defraud others of "money," did not fall under
ambit of depriving others of "anything of value," and
thus defendant could not mount vagueness challenge to
statute on basis that phrase "anything of value," as used
in statute was unconstitutionally vague; vast majority of
communications fraud statute's intended applications
would involve incidents where individuals had
defrauded others of "money" or "property," both of
which terms were sufficiently understood to allow
ordinary citizens to determine what conduct statute
prohibited. U.C.A.1953. 76-10-1801(1).
1251 Criminal Law ©=*13.1(1)
110k 13.1 (1) Most Cited Cases
Speculation about possible vagueness in hypothetical
situations not before the court will not support a facial
attack on a statute when it is surely valid in
the vast majority of its intended applications.
*735 Jennifer K. Gowans, Fillmore Spencer LLC,
Provo, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and Jeffrey S.
Gray, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee.
Before BENCH, Associate P.J., and DAVIS and

© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

97 P.3d 732
97 P.3d 732, 506 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 UT App 267
(Cite as: 97 P.3d 732, 2004 UT App 267)

ORME,JJ.
OPINION
DAVIS, Judge:
**1 After entering an unconditional, voluntary guilty
plea to three counts of communications fraud, Richard
Norris (Defendant) challenges the constitutionality of
the underlying statute (the communications fraud
statute) on appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801
(2003). TFNU We affirm.
FN1. Because the communications fraud
statute has not changed since Defendant was
charged, we cite to the most current version
for convenience.
BACKGROUND
**2 Defendant was charged with seven counts of
communications fraud and was bound over on all
counts. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003).
After several days of trial, Defendant entered an
unconditional, voluntary guilty plea to three counts of
third-degree-felony communications fraud. See id. §
76-10-1801(l)(c). After sentencing, and without
moving to withdraw his guilty pleas, Defendant filed a
timely notice of appeal, mounting a facial challenge to
the constitutionality of the communications fraud statute
on overbreadth and vagueness grounds.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[11[21F31 **3 We consider two issues on appeal. First,
we must determine whether this court has subject matter
jurisdiction to consider Defendant's constitutional
challenge after Defendant entered an unconditional,
voluntary guilty plea. "The determination of whether a
court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of
law, which we review for correctness...." Beaver
County v. Qwest Inc.. 2001 UT 81,11 8, 31 P.3d 1147.
Second, if this court has jurisdiction, then we must
consider whether the communications fraud statute is
unconstitutionally overbroad or vague on its face.
"Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions
of law, which we review for correctness." Provo City
Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14,11 5, 86 P.3d 735.
"When addressing such a challenge, this court presumes
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that the statute is valid, and we resolve any reasonable
doubts in favor of constitutionality." State v. Lopes,
1999 UT 24,116, 980 P.2d 191.
ANALYSIS
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
[41T51 **4 "The general rule applicable in criminal
proceedings ... is that by pleading guilty, the defendant
is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements
of the *736 crime charged and thereby waives all
nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea
constitutional violations." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d
1275.1278 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Hardy, 2002
UT App 244,11 13, 54 P.3d 645. The State asserts that
Defendant's facial challenge to the constitutionality of
the communications fraud statute falls within the ambit
of the "pre-plea constitutional violations" mentioned in
Parsons. 781 P.2dat 1278. Therefore, the State argues
that because Defendant's challenge is nonjurisdictional
in nature, it was waived by his guilty plea. Defendant
asserts that "pre-plea constitutional violations," id^
encompass violations involving such things as Miranda
admonitions and search warrants, and that a facial
constitutional challenge to a statute is, at its heart, a
jurisdictional issue. Therefore, Defendant argues that
his challenge was not waived by his guilty plea.
r6ir71[81 **5 "Subject matter jurisdiction is the power
and authority of the court to determine a controversy
and without which it cannot proceed." Thompson v.
Jackson, 743P.2d 1230,1232 (UtahCt.App. 1987)(per
curiam). Subject matter jurisdiction "can neither be
waived nor conferred by consent of the accused.
Objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter may be urged at any stage of the
proceedings, and the right to make such an objection is
never waived." James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570
(Utah Ct.App. 1998) (quotations and citations omitted).
When subject matter jurisdiction is an issue, "[i]t is the
duty of this court to 'satisfy itself not only of its own
jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause
under review.'" EEOCv. Chicago Club, 86F.3d 1423,
1428 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293
U.S. 237, 244, 55 S.Ct. 162, 79 L.Ed. 338 (1934)).
TFN21
FN2. Instead of focusing on whether subject
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matter jurisdiction exists in a particular
context, Judge Bench relies on Utah cases
generally describing jurisdiction of our courts
of general jurisdiction. The issue squarely
presented in this case has not been addressed
by Utah courts.
Our jurisprudence, however, is no stranger to
the concept that a court with general
jurisdiction over a particular claim may or
may not have subject matter jurisdiction over
that claim. Although not directly analogous to
the case at bar, perhaps the best example
involves claims against governmental entities.
There is no question that courts of general
jurisdiction in Utah have jurisdiction over
those claims. This notwithstanding, however,
Utah appellate decisions have repeatedly held
that the failure to strictly comply with the
statutory requirements for claims against
governmental entities deprives those courts of
subject matter jurisdiction over such claims.
See, e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit Auth, 2001
UT 109,111116-17,37 P.3d 1156; SecurityInv.
Ltd. v. Brown, 2002 UT App 131,11 13, 47
P.3d97.
f9iri01 **6 "In general, a plea of guilty waives all
nonjurisdictional defects, but does not bar appeal of
claims that the applicable statute is unconstitutional or
that the indictment fails to state an offense." United
States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262 n. 1 (9th
Cir.1979). "Although a guilty plea waives all non[
]jurisdictional defects and fact issues, a vagueness
challenge is a jurisdictional defect. Thus, following a
guilty plea, a defendant could raise on appeal that he
was prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute."
United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th
Cir.1994) (quotations and citation omitted); see Menna
v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241, 46
L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) (per curiam) ("We simply hold that
a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim thatjudged on its face--the charge is one which the State
may not constitutionally prosecute."); Blackledze v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d
628 (1974) (holding that guilty plea did not preclude
the defendant from raising his constitutional claims
because they "went to the very power of the State to

bring the defendant into court to answer the charge
brought against him"); United States v. Whited, 311
F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir.2002) (addressing defendant's
claim that the underlying statute was unconstitutional
because it "properly f[e]ll within the narrow scope of
review not barred by a guilty plea"), cert, denied, 538
U.S. 1065, 123 S.Ct. 2234, 155 L.Ed.2d 1121 (2003);
United States y. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th
Cir.2000) (recognizing that a claim that a statute is
facially unconstitutional is a jurisdictional claim not
waived by a guilty plea); United States v. McKenzie, 99
F.3d813, 816 (7th Cir. 1996) (addressing defendant's
argument on appeal after his guilty plea because he
made "the only argument *737 available to him by
asserting a jurisdictional challenge based on the
constitutionality of the underlying statute"); United
States y. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 885 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1996)
("[The defendant] entered his guilty plea without
preserving his constitutional challenge[ to the
underlying statute] for appeal.
However, the
government has expressly declined to raise a waiver
argument, citing United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495,
496-97 (7th Cir. 1995) (challenge to constitutionality of
statute of conviction is, in certain circumstances,
jurisdictional claim not waived by guilty plea)."); Bell,
70 F.3d at 496-97 (addressing defendant's challenge to
the constitutionality of the underlying statute after
recognizing the principle that such a challenge "is a
jurisdictional claim which is not waived by the guilty
plea"); United States v. Palacios-Casquete, 55 F.3d
557, 561 (UthCir.1995) ("A guilty plea ... does not
waive the right of an accused to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute under which he is
convicted."); Marzano v. Kincheloe, 915 F.2d 549,552
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant "did not
waive his constitutional attack on the [underlying]
statute by pleading guilty"); United States v. Mont ilia,
870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that although
the dividing line between constitutional claims that are
waived by a guilty plea and those that survive the plea
is not "crystal-clear," "[c]laims that 'the applicable
statute is unconstitutional or that the indictment fails to
state an offense' are jurisdictional claims not waived by
the guilty plea" (quoting Broncheau, 597 F.2d at 1262
n. 1)), amended by 907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Bar boa, 111 F.2d 1420, 1423 n. 3
(10th Cir. 1985) ("A plea of guilty ... does not bar a
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claim that the defendant may not constitutionally be
convicted m the first instance
If [the defendant]
ple[aded] guilty to something which was not a crime, he
is not now precluded from raising this jurisdictional
defect, which goes 'to the very power of the State to
bring the defendant into court to answer the charge
brought against him'" (quoting Blackledze, 417 U S
at 30, 94 S Ct 2098)), United States v Hill, 564 F 2d
1179, 1180 (5th Cir 1977) (per curiam) (recognizing
that "a guilty plea does not bar an appeal that asserts
that the charge is unconstitutional"), United States v
Tallant, 547 F2d 1291, 1295 n 5 (5th Cir 1977)
(recognizing that a claim based upon "the
unconstitutionality of the statute underlying the
indictment" was an "appealable issue[ ] following a
guilty plea"), United States v Winter, 509 F 2d 975,
978 n 8 (5th Cir 1975) (recognizing "that after entering
a plea of guilty, a defendant may only appeal
jurisdictional defects in the proceeding below, such as
the unconstitutionality of the statute underlying the
indictment"), Mercado v Rockefeller, 502 F 2d 666,
672 (2d Cir 1974) ("[I]t is clear that [a] guilty plea
waives only nonjunsdictional defects and does not
waive the right to contest the constitutionality of the
statute that is the basis for a conviction" (second
alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted)),
United States v Cox, 464 F 2d 937, 941 (6th Cir 1972)
(recognizing that "[a] defendant who has pleaded guilty
is not barred from claiming
that the statute under
which he was charged is unconstitutional" (quotations
and citation omitted)), 1A Charles Alan Wright,
Federal Practice and Procedure Criminal § 175 (3d ed
1999) ("[T]he preclusive effects of guilty pleas do not
apply to constitutional claims that go 'to the very power
of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer
the charge brought against him ' A defendant who has
pleaded guilty may still contend that the statute under
which he was charged is unconstitutional" (quoting
Blackled^e, 417 U S at 30, 94 S Ct 2098) (footnotes
omitted))
*w7 Because a facial challenge to the constitutionality
of a statute directly cuts to "the power and authority of
the court to determine a controversy," Thompson, 743
P2d at 1232, it is necessarily a jurisdictional matter
Accordingly, an unconditional guilty plea does not
operate as a waiver of a facial constitutional challenge
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to a statute, because such a challenge is jurisdictional in
nature [FN31 *738 Therefore, we address Defendant's
arguments TFN41
FN3 The justice court appeal process analog
in Judge Bench's opinion is somewhat
puzzling
Since justice courls are not courts of record,
traditional appellate review is generally
unavailable or >everely limited
This
notwithstanding, the Utah Constitution
guarantees "the right to appeal in all[ criminal]
cases" Utah Const art 1, § 12 In City of
Monticello v Chrutensen, 788 P 2d 513 (Utah
1990), our supreme court ruled that the trial de
novo appellate procedure now set out m Utah
Code Annotated section 78-5-120 (2002)
satisfied this constitutional mandate See
Christensen, 788 P 2d at 518-19 Following a
trial de novo, traditional appeal therefrom is
available only if "the district court rules on the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance "
Utah Code Ann § 78-5- 120(7)
In our view, this unique process for obtaining
review of justice court proceedings has
nothing to do v/ith issue preservation or
waiver of nonjunsdictional constitutional
claims by voluntary guilty plea- section
78-5-120 makes no reference to either
Indeed, if anything, it is a recognition of the
importance of claims involving the
constitutionality of statutes or ordinances,
specifically contemplating such challenges in
the court of record in the first appeal Under
the statutory scheme, raising the constitutional
challenge to the statute or ordinance is the
method by which jurisdiction is conferred on
appellate courts lo entertain further appeals,
the defendant having already been accorded
his or her constitutional right of appeal from
the justice court by trial de novo in a court of
record This is a far cry from the ability to
challenge subject matter jurisdiction in an
initial appeal of right
FN4 The State argues that Myers v State,
2004UT31,94P3d211, both addresses and

© 2005 Thomson/West No Claim to Orig U S Govt Works

97 P.3d 732
97 P.3d 732, 506 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 UT App 267
(Cite as: 97 P.3d 732, 2004 UT App 267)

disposes of the issues herein. The appellant's
claims in Myers were based upon the
Post-Conviction Remedies Act, see id atf 10;
and, to the extent the appellant alluded to
constitutional defects in a statute, his
challenge was not facial. Accordingly, the
Utah Supreme Court characterized his
argument as based on an "allegedly incorrect
legal interpretation [of a rule of law]," and
never addressed or ruled upon the effect of a
facial constitutional challenge. Id at ^j 17.
II. Constitutional Challenge
**8 Defendant argues that the communications fraud
statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003). We consider
each of his arguments in turn.
A. Overbreadth
nnri21fl31 **9 "In considering whether a statute [is
overbroad], a court's first task is to determine whether
the enactment reaches a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct." In re IM L , 2002
UT 110,11 15,61 P.3d 1038 (quotations and citations
omitted). We examine "criminal statutes ... with
particular care; those that make unlawful a substantial
amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be
held facially invalid even if they also have legitimate
application." Id_ (quotations and citations omitted).
However, "[o]nly a statute that is substantially
overbroad may be invalidated on its face." City of
Houston v Hill, 482 U S 451,458, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96
LEd.2d 398 (1987). Overbreadth "must not only be
real, but substantial as well " Ashcroft v ACLU, 535
U.S. 564,584,122 S.Ct. 1700,152L.Ed.2d771 (2002)
(quotations and citation omitted).
ri41[151fl61 **10 When interpreting the challenged
language, "we look to the statute's plain language and
presume that the legislature used each term advisedly."
In re I ML, 2002 UT 110 at If 16, 61 P.3d 1038.
"Statutory language is overbroad if its language
proscribes both harmful and innocuous behavior." Salt
Lake City v Lopez, 935 P 2d 1259, 1263 (Utah
Ct.App.1997) (quotations and citations omitted). The
communications fraud statute prohibits
devis[ing] any scheme or artifice to defraud another
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or to obtain from another money, property, or
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises, or material
omissions, and ... communicat [ing] directly or
indirectly with any person by any means for the
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or
artifice.
Utah Code Ann §76-10-1801(1). Defendant posits
that the communications fraud statute is overbroad
"because it permits criminal prosecution and sanctions
in every case involving a communicationf ] that could
be construed as dishonest." Specifically, Defendant
argues that the communications fraud statute does not
require an intent to defraud, and that it criminalizes
innocuous behavior because "[a]s long as there is an
artifice, a false communication in any form made for the
purpose of executing the artifice, and a desire to obtain
anything of value, the elements of the communications
fraud statute are met." Defendant also alleges that the
modes of communications prohibited *739 in the
communications fraud statute are similarly overbroad
and prohibit constitutionally protected conduct. See id.
§76-10-1801(6). We disagree.
[17] * * 11 First, the communications fraud statute does
not prohibit all false "pretenses, representations,
promises, or material omissions," only those where an
individual seeks "to defraud another or to obtain from
another money, property, or anything of value." Id §
76-10-1801(1). Second, it requires proof that the false
or fraudulent "pretenses, representations, promises, or
material omissions made or omitted were made or
omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless
disregard for the truth." Id §76-10-1801(7). While the
First Amendment may value some falsehoods for their
contribution to public debate, see New York Times Co
v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n. 19, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11
LEd.2d 686 (1964), it has not given protection to
malicious statements that were made "with knowledge
that [they were] false or with reckless disregard of
whether [they were] false or not." Id at 279-80, 84
S Ct. 710. The communications fraud statute draws the
distinction between criminal and innocent behavior with
a similar mens rea, and thus, it cannot be said that it is
"substantially overbroad" and should be "invalidated on
its face." Hill, 482 U.S. at 458, 107 S.Ct 2502.
Accordingly, we conclude that the communications
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fraud statute is not overbroad on its face.
B. Vagueness
[18iri91 **12
Defendant argues that the
communications fraud statute is unconstitutionally
vague in its use of the terms "artifice," "communicate,"
and "anything of value."
Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-1801(1). (6)(a).
"The void-for-vagueness
doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance define an
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265
(quotations and citations omitted). However, because
the communications fraud statute "implicates no
constitutionally protected conduct," Defendant must
show that it "is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc , 455 U.S. 489,494-95, 102 S.Ct.
1186,71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982),
f20H2Ur221 **13 Defendant argues that the term
"artifice," Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1), is defined
too broadly and would encompass any form of deceit so
that ordinary persons would not know whether the
deceit was prohibited. While not defined in the
communications fraud statute, "artifice" is commonly
understood to mean "an artful stratagem," or a "trick."
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 106 (9th
ed.1986). Black's Law Dictionary defines "artifice"
similarly as "[a] clever plan or idea, especially] one
intended to deceive." Black's Law Dictionary 108 (7th
ed.1999). Additionally, we do not read the term
"artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), in a
vacuum, but rather as it relates to the other terms within
the communications fraud statute. See Dowling v.
Bullen, 2004 UT 50,^ 8, 94 P.3d 915 (stating that
"[sjubsections of a statute should not be construed in a
vacuum but must be read as part of the statute as a
whole" (alteration in original) (quotations and citation
omitted)). Contrary to Defendant's assertions, the
communications fraud statute does not prohibit all artful
stratagems and tricks, only those meant to, inter alia,
defraud others. While the term "artifice," Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), may be construed broadly, "a
statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it is
broad." State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah
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1989). We conclude that the term "artifice," Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), is used with "sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."
Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 (quotations and citations
omitted). Therefore, we conclude that the term
"artifice," as used in the co>mmunications fraud statute,
is not unconstitutionally vague. Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-1801(1).
[231 **14 Defendant next argues that the term
"communicate," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6)(a),
is vague because it is "given the broadest possible
definition" under the *740 communications fraud
statute. The communications fraud statute prohibits
"communicating] directly or indirectly with any person
by any means for the purpose of executing or
concealing the scheme or artifice."
Id §
76-10-1801(1). Additionally, it specifically states that
to communicate "means to bestow, convey, make
known, recount, impart; to give by way of information;
to talk over; or to transmit information." Id. §
76-10-1801(6)(a). Defendant's argument is unavailing.
Although "communicate," Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-1801(6)(a), is broadly defined, this does not
necessarily make the term unconstitutionally vague. See
Wareham, 772P.2dat966. Indeed, the communications
fraud statute does not seek to punish those who keep an
artifice or scheme to themselves. Defendant fails to
demonstrate how "ordinary people canfnot] understand
what conduct is prohibited," Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265
(quotations and citations omitted), and therefore, fails
to demonstrate that the term "communicate," as used in
the communications fraud statute, is unconstitutionally
vague. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6)(a).
f24ir251 **15 Finally, Defendant argues that the
phrase "anything of value," Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-1801(1), is unconstitutionally vague because it is
undefined and left open to a variety of interpretations.
Defendant proffers numerous hypothetical situations in
an attempt to illustrate the vagueness of the phrase
"anything of value." Id. However, "speculation about
possible vagueness in hypothetical situations not before
the [c]ourt will not support a facial attack on a statute
when it is surely valid in the vast majority of its

© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Page 9

97 P.3d 732
97 P.3d 732, 506 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 UT App 267
(Cite as: 97 P.3d 732, 2004 UT App 267)

intended applications." Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,
733, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000)
(quotations and citation omitted). Defendant was
charged under the communications fraud statute
because he devised a scheme to defraud others of
"money." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). We
believe that "the vast majority of [the communications
fraud statute's] intended applications," Colorado, 530
U.S. at 733, 120 S.Ct. 2480 (quotations and citations
omitted), will involve incidents where individuals have
defrauded others of "money" or "property," Utah Code
Ann. §76-10-1801(1), both of which are terms that are
sufficiently understood to allow ordinary citizens to
determine what conduct is prohibited. See Lopez, 935
P.2d at 1265. Additionally, because Defendant was
charged with devising a scheme to defraud others of
"money," Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1), his actions
do not fall within the "anything of value" realm, id^ and
thus, he may not challenge this phrase as
unconstitutionally vague. See Village of Hoffman
Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n. 7, 102 S.Ct. 1186 ("One to
whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not
successfully challenge it for vagueness." (quotations
and citation omitted)). [FN51
FN5. In his brief on appeal, Defendant states
that "[a]rguably, this is precisely the type of
conduct the communications fraud statute was
intended to prohibit."
**16 Defendant's constitutional challenge to the
communications fraud statute fails. We conclude that
the communications fraud statute is neither
unconstitutionally overbroad, nor unconstitutionally
vague.
CONCLUSION
**17 A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute is jurisdictional in nature and, therefore, we
conclude that Defendant's facial challenge to the
constitutionality of the communications fraud statute is
not barred by his voluntary, unconditional guilty plea.
However, in considering Defendant's facial challenge to
the communications fraud statute on overbreadth and
vagueness grounds, we conclude that it is not
unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. Accordingly,
we affirm Defendant's conviction.

ORME, Judge (concurring):
**18 I concur in the court's opinion. I write separately
to explain my position, because I recognize the lead
opinion represents a departure from the general
prohibition against raising issues for the first time on
appeal, especially in the face of a guilty plea.
**19 For me, the easy proposition is this: Subject
matter jurisdiction is an issue that may be raised by
either party or the court at any time. So far as I am
aware, there is no exception to this rule for guilty pleas.
See *741 James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah
Ct.App.1998) ("[Subject matter jurisdiction] is derived
from the law. It can neither be waived nor conferred by
consent of the accused. Objection to the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter may be urged at any
stage of the proceedings, and the right to make such an
objection is never waived.") (internal quotations &
citation omitted), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah
1999).
**20 In this sense, the lead opinion's analogy to
sovereign immunity cases is actually pretty good. If a
plaintiff sued the State without giving the required
presuit notice, and the State did not raise the lack of
notice as a defense below, it would presumably not be
permitted to raise the lack of notice for the first time on
appeal in challenging a judgment that had been entered
against it. However, if giving the presuit notice is
necessary to vest the court with subject matter
jurisdiction, then of course the lack of notice could be
raised for the first time on appeal. And indeed, giving
presuit notice strictly in compliance with the sovereign
immunity statute has been held to be a matter of subject
matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit
Auth, 2001 UT 109,11 16, 37 P.3d 1156.
**21 While this kind of subject matter jurisdiction
issue usually arises in civil cases, the concept is the
same in criminal cases. If a guilty plea is entered, and
no issues are reserved for appeal consistent with State
v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct.App.1988), then
unless the guilty plea is set aside as involuntary, all
issues are waived on appeal, except subject matter
jurisdiction, which can never be waived. See James,
965 P.2d at 570. Thus, if a 32-year-old defendant was
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charged with murder in juvenile court and pled guilty,
on appeal to this court he most certainly could
challenge the lack of the juvenile court's subject matter
jurisdiction over an adult charged with murder, see
Utah Code Ann. § § 78-3a-104, -105 (Supp.2003)--even
if the guilty plea was otherwise proper and he never
raised the jurisdictional problem below. The same is
true if a defendant pled guilty to the "crime" of
blasphemy, and no such criminal offense were on the
books in Utah. If he pled guilty, and did not raise below
the point that no such crime existed in Utah, he still
could challenge his conviction by raising, albeit for the
first time on appeal, the lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. And obviously he would succeed. The
trial court simply would lack the judicial power to
convict the defendant of a nonexistent crime.

jurisdiction can never be waived. In the
blasphemy hypothetical, if facial
unconstitutionality is a matter of subject
matter jurisdiction, it could be addressed for
the first time on appeal even if plain error was
not raised, see State v. All Real Property,
2004 UT App 232,1| 13 n. 7; was inadequately
raised, see State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1208-09 (Utah 1993) (holding that if any of
the requirements for plain error are not met,
"plain error is not established" and cannot be
raised); or was raised too late. See Coleman
v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98,11 9, 17 P.3d 1122
(holding court would not reach unpreserved
issues under plain error doctrine because plain
error raised for first time in reply brief).

**22 Here is where it gets admittedly more tricky:
Suppose our criminal code made it a felony to commit
the crime of blasphemy, defined as "disparaging the one
Almighty God or questioning His existence." If a
defendant pled guilty to that offense, did not preserve a
constitutional challenge for appeal under Sery, and did
not raise the constitutionality issue below, could he
raise for the first time on appeal the facial
unconstitutionality, under the First Amendment, of the
statute criminalizing blasphemy? At one level, it seems
that charges brought pursuant to such a statute would be
just as much a nullity as charges brought, as in the
immediately preceding hypothetical, in the complete
absence of any blasphemy statute. In simplest terms, in
this country there simply could be no crime of
blasphemy~any statute purporting to provide otherwise
would be facially unconstitutional. But he could not
raise this constitutional challenge for the first time on
appeal unless facial unconstitutionality goes to subject
matter jurisdiction. TFN11 Does it? I am not
completely sure, although I can see that, in concept, an
unconstitutional statute is as ineffectual as no statute.

*742 **23 This is what ultimately explains my vote in
this case: No Utah appellate court has squarely
answered the question of whether a challenge to a
criminal statute based on facial unconstitutionality goes
to subject matter jurisdiction. The lead opinion cites a
multitude of cases that have held it does; Judge Bench's
opinion cites no case that has addressed the question
and held it does not. JFN2] It is admittedly somewhat
counterintuitive for me thai a substantive conclusion of
unconstitutionality-even
facial
unconstitutionality-defeats subject matter jurisdiction,
but that seems to be the prevailing view. Accordingly,
with some trepidation, I concur in the court's opinion.

FN1. Judge Bench points out such an
argument could be reached under the plain
error doctrine. Maybe. But the rescue
opportunity provided by the plain error
doctrine is rather limited. As hereafter shown,
the ability to claim plain error can itself be
waived.
In contrast, subject matter

FN2.1 disagree with Judge Bench's claim that
Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 94 P.3d 211,
considered this question and rejected it on the
merits. The Myers court described the
jurisdictional argument asserted in the case as
being "somewhat convoluted." Id. at If 15.
Later, the Court characterized the argument as
being tantamount to a "claim[ ] that the trial
court's decision constituted an 'erroneous
application of the law.'" Id atf 17 (citation
omitted). In any event, the Court's dismissal
of the jurisdictional argument in Myers was
premised on the simplistic notion that " '[a]
court has subject matter jurisdiction if the case
is one of the type of cases the court has been
empowered to entertain by the constitution or
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statute from which the court derives its
authority,' " id. at If 16 (citation omitted)~an
obvious overstatement as readily shown by the
sovereign immunity example, i.e., district
courts have general civil jurisdiction and even
jurisdiction over disputes against the State, but
lack subject matter jurisdiction over such a
case if the presuit notice is flawed in some
way. Another example of the overbreadth of
the pronouncement in Myers is the fact that
appellate courts have the constitutional and
statutory power to consider appeals, and yet
are held to lack subject matter jurisdiction
over appeals that are untimely. See Utah
Const, art. VIII § 3 ("The Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction over all other
matters to be exercised as provided by statute
...."); id. § 5 ("The jurisdiction of all other
courts, both original and appellate, shall be
provided by statute."); Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3) (2002) (specifying Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction); id. § 78-2a-3(2)
(specifying appellate jurisdiction of Court of
Appeals); Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux,
767 P.2d 569, 571 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (
"[Fjailure to file an appeal within the required
time limit deprived the court of subject matter
jurisdiction.") (citing Watson v. Anderson, 29
Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003, 1004 (1973)).
The very best indication that the Myers court
simply did not have before it the issue we
must decide—at least not in any kind of cogent,
well-developed way-is that the only authority
cited in Myers is two decisions from the Utah
Court of Appeals and the statute giving the
district courts original jurisdiction of "all
matters civil and criminal," subject to certain
limitations. Myers, 2004 UT 31 at If 16, 94
P.3d 211 (quoting Utah Code Ann. $
78-3-4(0(2002)). The Myers opinion did not
acknowledge, much less did it treat, the
extensive state and federal jurisprudence
categorizing the facial unconstitutionality of a
criminal statute as being a matter of subject
matter jurisdiction-a virtual impossibility if
the argument had actually been made and was
well-supported, as in the instant case.
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BENCH, Judge (concurring in the result):
**24 I do not necessarily disagree with the main
opinion's analysis of the constitutionality of the
communications fraud statute. See Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-1801 (2003). But, because of the procedural
posture of this case, I would rule that we cannot reach
the issue under controlling Utah law. [FNII
FN1. Given the clarity of the Utah law,
decisions from the federal courts are not
helpful. Nor are the federal cases even
consistent with each other. See, e.g., United
States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th
Cir.1989) amended by 907 F.2d 115 (9th
Cir.1990) ("The dividing line between the
majority of constitutional claims waived by a
voluntary plea of guilty, and those that
challenge the right of the state to hale the
defendant into court, and thus survive the plea
..., has not been crystal-clear.").
**25 As recognized by the main opinion, Defendant
entered an unconditional guilty plea to three counts of
communications fraud. Cf. State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935,
939 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) (allowing defendants to enter
conditional pleas preserving the right to appeal any
specified pretrial ruling).
In the district court,
Defendant never challenged the constitutionality of the
statute. Nor did he enter a conditional plea to preserve
his right to appeal the constitutionality of the
communications fraud statute. See id_ Furthermore,
Defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,113, 40 P.3d 630
(requiring defendant to file a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea within thirty days after the entry of the plea
before defendant can challenge the validity of the guilty
plea on appeal). Instead, Defendant filed a notice of
appeal directly from his sentence. Now, for the first
time, Defendant attempts to raise the issues of *743
overbreadth and vagueness as constitutional
challenges to the communications fraud statute. He
claims he can do so because subject matter jurisdiction
cannot be waived and that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to convict him of violating an
unconstitutional statute.
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**26 This approach reflects a basic misunderstanding
of jurisdiction. The Utah Supreme Court recently
explained subject matter jurisdiction very succinctly as
follows: "A court has subject matter jurisdiction if the
case is one of the type of cases the court has been
empowered to entertain by the constitution or statute
from which the court derives its authority." Myers v.
State, 2004 UT 31,f 16, 94 P.3d 211 (other quotations
and citation omitted); see also Salt Lake City v. Ohms,
881 P.2d 844, 852 (Utah 1994) ("Subject matter
jurisdiction is 'the authority and competency of the
court to decide the case.'" (citations omitted)).
**27 The main opinion contends that a facial
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is
necessarily a jurisdictional matter because the inherent
constitutionality of a statute affects whether a court has
the power and authority to decide the issue. However,
without a proper challenge, courts must presume the
constitutionality of a statute.
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional until the
contrary is clearly shown. It is only when statutes
manifestly infringe upon some constitutional
provision that they can be declared void. Every
reasonable presumption must be indulged in and
every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of
constitutionality.
Jones v. Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53,11
10, 94 P.3d 283 (quotations and citations omitted).
Thus, because the communications fraud statute was not
challenged below, it is presumed to be constitutional,
and the district court had jurisdiction.
**28 In footnote two of the main opinion, my
colleagues attempt to find support for their
extraordinary decision by pointing to the distinction
between general jurisdiction and subject matter
jurisdiction. As noted by the main opinion, we do not
focus "on whether subject matter jurisdiction exists in
[this] particular context" because, unlike claims made
against governmental entities—which require
compliance with the Immunity Act—the
communications fraud statute at issue here requires that
nothing be done, by either party, before criminal
defendants can be prosecuted and courts can exercise
subject matter jurisdiction. With claims against a
governmental entity, "the legislature has explicitly
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declared how, what, when, and to whom a party must
direct and deliver a Notice in order to preserve his or
her right to maintain an action against a governmental
entity." Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109,Tf
15, 37 P.3d 1156. Thus, "[compliance with the
Immunity Act is necessary to confer subject matter
jurisdiction upon a trial court to hear claims against
governmental entities." Id. at^t 16. In the instant case,
as with presumably every other criminal prosecution,
the charging statute does not explicitly declare what
must be done before subject matter jurisdiction is
conferred.
Thus, the district court had general
jurisdiction as well as subject matter jurisdiction due to
an absence of legislative requirements or limitations.
[FN21
FN2. In an attempt to bolster the main
opinion's reasoning, the concurring opinion
discusses some rather bizarre hypotheticals.
First, the thirty-two-year-old defendant
charged with murder in juvenile court.
Thankfully, this potential calamity has already
been resolved by our legislature. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-104, - 105(l)(a) (2002)
(detailing jurisdiction of juvenile courts). By
contrast, our legislature has not limited the
jurisdiction of district courts in a similar
manner. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1)
(2002) ("The district court has original
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal,
not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not
prohibited by law."). Second, the criminal
defendant who pleads guilty to the nonexistent
crime of blasphemy. If no such crime of
blasphemy existed, then we would not indulge
in the presumption that a nonexistent,
unwritten statute was constitutional. Here,
however, a statute does exist, and, until
challenged, we must presume it to be
constitutional. Third, if a defendant pleaded
guilty to the theoretical crime of blasphemy,
and did not preserve his constitutional
challenge, then he could raise the challenge
for the first time on appeal by arguing plain
error. A plain error challenge could easily be
made without making the facial
constitutionality of a statute a prerequisite to
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subject matter jurisdiction.
As for the concurring opinion's statement that
"[n]o Utah appellate court has squarely
answered the question of whether a challenge
based on facial unconstitutionality goes to
subject matter jurisdiction," our supreme court
has squarely addressed the question. In Myers
v. State, 2004 UT 31, 94 P.3d 211, the Utah
Supreme Court explained that even when
Myers argued, for the first time on appeal, that
the wholly and facially unconstitutional
aggravated murder statute divested the trial
court of jurisdiction, he had "failed to state
any legitimate jurisdictional defect" because
"[t]he Utah Code provides that 'the district
court has original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah
Constitution and not prohibited by law.1" Id.
at H 16 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-34(1)). The instant case is no different. Thus,
even when Norris argues, for the first time on
appeal, that the communications fraud statute
is facially unconstitutional, and that such
unconstitutionality goes to the subject matter
jurisdiction of the district court, he fails "to
state any legitimate jurisdictional defect."
Myers, 2004 UT 31 at f 16, 94 P.3d 211.
*744 **29 Therefore, if Defendant wanted to
challenge the constitutionality of the communications
fraud statute, he had to do so first in the district court.
See, e.g., State v. Puzmire, 898 P.2d 271, 272 (Utah
Ct.App.1995) ("Although [defendant] raises the issue
on appeal, he did not challenge the constitutionality of
this statutory scheme before the trial court. As a
general rule, we will not consider issues-including
constitutional issues-initially raised on appeal."); State
v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah Ct.App.1990) ("As the
Utah appellate courts have reiterated many times, we
generally will not consider an issue, even a
constitutional one, which the appellant raises on appeal
for the first time.").
**30 This rule applies with equal force to facial
challenges to a statute made for the first time on appeal.
In State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah
Ct.App.1991), when a facial challenge to a criminal
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statute was raised for the first time on appeal, this court
addressed Archambeau's challenge only for the "plain
error" and "exceptional circumstances" arguments he
made. See Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922, 926.
Defendant, in the instant appeal, asserts no claim of
plain error or exceptional circumstances.
**31 Allowing defendants to raise constitutional
challenges for the first time on appeal will logically
necessitate overruling a large body of jurisdictional
jurisprudence involving Utah's justice courts. See, e.g.,
City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 517
(Utah 1990) ("[T]his Court [has] repeatedly held that a
person dissatisfied with a justice court decision could
appeal that decision to a district court and that the
district court decision was final unless the validity or
constitutionality of a statute was at issue, not on appeal,
but in the lower court."); Draper City v. Roper, 2003
UT App 312,11 2, 78 P.3d 631 (per curiam) (" 'The
decision of the district court [from a hearing de novo
following a justice court's ruling] is final and may not
be appealed unless the district court rules on the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.' " (quoting
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7))): South Salt Lake City
v. Terkelson, 2002 UT App 405,11 6, 61 P.3d 282
("Utah case law clearly provides that neither this court
nor the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear an
appeal from proceedings in the district court held
pursuant to an appeal from the justice court unless the
issues raised in the justice court involve[ ] the validity
or constitutionality of an ordinance or statute."
(quotations and citations omitted)); City ofKanab v.
Guskey. 965 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah Ct.App.1998)
("[Historically, Utah appellate courts have never had
jurisdiction to hear appeals of district court decisions
after a de novo trial on appeal from an unfavorable
justice court judgment, absent the raising of a
constitutional challenge in the justice court."). The
practical consequence of the main opinion is that
defendants will now be allowed to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute in this court, for the first
time, without ever having bothered to raise the issue in
either justice or district court.
**32 Having failed below to challenge the statute on
grounds of overbreadth and vagueness, and having
failed on appeal to argue either plain error or
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exceptional circumstances, Defendant is now precluded
from challenging the constitutionality of the
communications fraud statute. I would therefore affirm
based on Defendant's failure to preserve his
constitutional challenge.
97 P.3d 732, 506 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,2004 UT App 267
END OF DOCUMENT
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INFORMATIONS

Keith L. Stoney (3868)
City Prosecutor
West Valley City
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley Citv, UT 84119
(801) 963-3331
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH (WVC)
Plaintiff,

I N F O R M A T I O N

v.

Case No. C\ i\ { 0 0 4 3 ^ 1 m C L ;

NORRIS, RICHARD F.
678 WILLIAMSBURG
SANDY, UTAH
5/15/55

Defendant.
The undersigned, KEITH L. STONEY, under oath, states on
information and belief that the defendant, on or about 12 MAY 1994,
at the vicinity of 3392 WEST 3500 SOUTH, West Valley City, Utah,
did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of:

COUNT 1:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A"

COUNT 2:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A"

COUNT 3:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A"

COUNT 4:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A"

This information
following witnesses:

is based on evidence obtained

MICHAEL MABRY
BONNIE GESSEL
JOAN MATTSON
KAYLYNN CROSBY
LISA STAUFFER
SHERRY FRANCIS
DOUG FAY
xi

from the

DETECTIVE PLOTNICK**PLEASE LET US KNOW IF THERE ARE ADDITIONAL
WITNESSES**

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant bases this information on the following:
WITNESSES STATED TO OFFICERS, THE DEFENDANT ON FOUR DIFFERENT
OCCASIONS UNLAWFULLY DEFRAUDED ANOTHER OR OBTAINED FROM ANOTHER,
MS^EY
PROPERTY, OR ANYTHING OF VALUE BY MEANS OF FALSE OR
FRAUDULENT PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, PROMISES, OR MATERIAL
OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH ANY PERSON
BY A S M ^ N S F O R THE PURPOSE OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME;
TOE^FENDANT HAS NO BUSINESS LICENSE TO OBERATE IN WEST VALLEY AND
N S C U ^ E N T RESIDENCE.
THE DEFENDANTJ^^REABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN,
THEREFORE, THE CITY REQUESTS A WARRANT^OF ARREST.
Complain

94-25376, DR. HORRIS.K-Z
PTC: ,
D«cmu>er 19, 1994

Xll
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Keith L. Stoney (3868)
Valerie J. O'Brien (6624)
David L. Clark (6199)
City Prosecutor
West Valley City
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, UT 84119
(801) 963-3344
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH (WVC)
A M E N D E D
I N F O R M A T I O N

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 941004929
NORRIS, RICHARD F.
6 78 WILLIAMSBURG
SANDY, UTAH
5/15/55
Defendant.
The

undersigned,

KEITH

L.

STONEY,

under

oath,

states

on

information and belief that the defendant, on or about MARCH, APRIL
AND/OR MAY OF 1993, at the vicinity of 3392 WEST 3500 SOUTH, West
Valley City, Utah, did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of:

COUNT 1:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH,
APRIL OR MAY OF 19 9 3 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING
MORE THAN $30 0.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS,
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND
INDIRECTLY TO MICHAEL MABRY BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME.

COUNT 2:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH,
APRIL CR MAY OF 19 9 3 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING
MORE THAN $300.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS,
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND
xui

INDIRECTLY TO JOAN MATTSON BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME.
COUNT 3:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH,
APRIL OR MAY OF 19 9 3 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING
MORE THAN $300.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS,
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND
INDIRECTLY TO LISA STAUFFER BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME.

COUNT 4:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH,
APRIL OR MAY OF 19 9 3 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING
MORE THAN $300.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS,
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND
INDIRECTLY TO SUSAN HUNTER BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME.

This information
following witnesses:

is

based

on

evidence

MICHAEL MABRY
BONNIE GESSEL
JOAN MATTSON
KAYLYNN CROSBY
LISA STAUFFER
SHERRY FRANCIS
DOUG FAY
DETECTIVE PLOTNICK**PLEASE LET US KNOW
WITNESSES**
SUSAN HUNTER

obtained

from

the

IF THERE ARE ADDITIONAL

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant bases this information on the following:
RICHARD NORRIS PLACED A NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT FOR A $1400.00 A

2
xiv

MONTH SALARIED, WITH BENEFITS, POSITION FOR A DIET COUNSELOR, WHEN,
IN FACT, THE POSITION HE WAS OFFERING TO THE VICTIM WAS NOT A
POSITION OF THAT NATURE OR THE NATURE ADVERTISED OR SOLICITED OR
PROMISED SUCH THAT:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.

THE POSITION WAS NOT A SALARIED JOB WITH BENEFITS, OR
THE POSITION WAS NOT AS A DIET COUNSELOR, OR
THE POSITION WAS FOR COMMISSIONED SALES OF A DIET PRODUCT, OR
THE CONTRACT MR. NORRIS REQUIRED WAS NOT, WHAT HE SAID IT WAS
FOR AND AMOUNTED TO A DEBT OF OVER $309 TO EACH VICTIM THAT
SIGNED IT, OR
THE DIET PRODUCT WAS NOT A DIET PRODUCT, OR
THE DIET PRODUCT WAS NOT APPROVED AS A DIET PRODUCT, OR
THE AMOUNT OF PRODUCT SOLD TO THE VICTIM WAS MORE THAN THE
AMOUNT AGREED UPON BY AND PROMISED BY MR. NORRIS, HENCE THE
DEBT WAS GREATER THAN INTENDED
MR. NORRIS, AFTER THE SALE, WOULD NOT ACCEPT RETURNS OF THE
PRODUCT AS PREVIOUSLY INSINUATED, PROMISED OR AGREED, OR
MR. NORRIS KNEW THAT THE PRODUCT WAS NOT WHAT HE STATED IT
WAS, OR
MR. NORRIS USED THIS SCHEME KNOWING PEOPLE COULD NOT LIVE UP
TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONTRACT, OR
MR. NORRIS, KNOWING THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE OBLIGATION OF THE
VICTIMS, USED THIS SCHEME TO SUE THE VICTIMS TO MAKE MONEY FOR
HIS COMPANY, OR
MR. NORRIS, KNOWING THE IMPOSSIBILITY 0F~THE OBLIGATION OF THE
VICTIM, USED THIS SCHEME TO SUE THFjy-VTCT?IMS FOR THE FALSE
VALUES OF THE PRODUCT..

Complainant:

/dibitsQ4-25376, DR/CP, HORRIS.R2
PTC: ,
Ocnober 2, 1995

3
XV
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ERNIE W. JONES, 1736
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by: EW Jones
Assigned to: EW Jones

Plaintiff,
BAIL: $75,000.00
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail

-vs-

RICHARD F. NORRIS
AKA
OTN

DOB 05/15/1955,

INFORMATION

Case No.
Defendant.

9616 70 *(£ F

The undersigned Brook Plotnick - West Valley City Police Department, under oatn states
on information and belief that the defendant committed the crimes of:
COUNT I
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or_artjfice to defraud
another or to_obtain^from anothgr^ money or anythingj)f^ value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT II
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT III
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT IV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNTV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT VI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT VII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT IX
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT X
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
B. Plotnick; S. Humphrey; B. Gessel; J. Mattson; S. Hunter; K. Crosby; M. Mabry; L.
Stauffer; K. Utley; S. Francis; G. Fowler; K. Noland; D. Duffin and S. Lebaron.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your Affiant bases this Information on police report #94-25376 and the following:
1.
During the Spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisement in the newspaper.
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtained judgments against many of
these people.
2.
The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to
fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to
cover up this scheme.
BROOK PLOTNICK, Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
day of October, 1996.

MAGISTRATE
Authorized for presentment>and filing:
E. NEAL GUrWARSOr^Dj'strict Attorney
Deput/District Attorney' October 1, 1996
jp/96016093
/
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ROLL CALL
E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ERNIE W.JONES, 1736
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

JUDGE

±^323°°

LS&J&Z-

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Screened by: EW Jones
Assigned to: EW Jones

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

BAIL: $75,000.00
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail

-vsRICHARD F. NORRIS
AKA
OTN
Defendant.

AMENDED
INFORMATION

DOB 05/15/1955,

CaseNo.
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The undersigned Brook Plotnick - West Valley City Police Department, under oath states
on information and belief that the defendant committed the crimes of:
COUNT I
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Joan Mattson or to obtain from another Joan Mattson or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT II
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Mike Mabry or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT III
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Kay Utley or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT IV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Chris Atkin or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT V
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Randy Hunter or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT VI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud Joy
Slotsvic or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT VII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Kay Loemon or to obtain from Kay Loemon money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT VIII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Sherry Francis or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT IX
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Sherry Bailey or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT X
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Sue Hunter or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
B. Plotnick; S. Humphrey; B. Gessel; J. Mattson; S. Hunter; K. Crosby; M. Mabry; L.
Stauffer; K. Utley; S. Francis; G. Fowler; K. Noland; D. Duffin and S. Lebaron.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your Affiant bases this Information on police report #94-25376 and the following:
1.
During the Spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisement in the newspaper.
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtained judgments against many of
these people.
2.
The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to
fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to
cover up this scheme.
„ .
r \ ^~^—^
BROOK PLOTNICK, Affiant
Subscribed
day of

V
"0BERT K. WIDER

Authorized for presentment and filing:
E. NEAL GUNNARSON, District Attorney

Deputy DistricyAttorney, March 27, 1997
jp/96016093
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Data Table for Initial Criminal Filing
Prosecuting governmental entity: Salt Lake County
Prior related cases: None
Officer's Badge No. 8049
Agency Case Number: 94-25376
Arrest Date:
Jail Booking Number:
Defendant's Sex: Male
Defendant's Social Security Number:
Defendant's Driver's License Number: 8223961
State Issuing Defendant's Driver's License: Ut
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ERNEST W. JONES, 1736
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by: E. Jones
Assigned to: E. Jones

Plaintiff,
BAIL: $150,000.00
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail

-vs-

INFORMATION

RICHARD F. NORRIS
DOB 05/15/55,
OTN

97l£>D8^> f g

Case No.
Defendant.

The undersigned Brook Plotnick - West Valley City Police Department, under oath states
on information and belief that the defendant, committed the (ftimeis of:
COUNT I
t l f ^ - l l
/
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a TkmHTSgreeTelony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT II
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.09. j
COUNT III
X
^ ^ '
^
/
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third D e ^ > e l ^ n y , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT IV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT V
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT VI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT VII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT VIII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT IX
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT X
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT XI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XIII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Lemmon money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT XIV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Lemmon money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XVI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT XVII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XVIII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XVIIII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.

xxxhi

00008

INFORMATION
STATE OF UTAH v. RICHARD F. NORRIS
DAONo. 97006614
Page 8

COUNT XX
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Officer Brook Plotnick, S. Humphrey, B. Gessel, Joan Mattson, Sue Hunter, Kay Crosby,
Mike Mabry, L. Stauffer, Kay Utley, S. Francis, O. Fowler, K. Noland, D. Duffin and S.
Lebaron.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your Affiant bases this Information on police report #94-25376 and the following:
1.
During the Spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisement in the newspaper.
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtained judgments against many of
these people.
2.

The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to
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fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to
cover up this scheme.

BROOK PLOTNICK
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to
day of May, 1997. j ' cf-
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Authorized for presentment and filing:
E. NEAL GUNNARSON, T^istrict Attorney

4-

<//
y^i^~
' pL><-£^/
Deputy District Attorpfey
May 15, 1997
msy/97006614
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Data Table for Initial Criminal Filing
Prosecuting governmental entity: Salt Lake County
Prior related cases: none
Officer's Badge No. 8049
Agency Case Number: 94-25376
Arrest Date:
Jail Booking Number:
Defendant's Sex: Male
Defendant's Social Security Number:
Defendant's Driver's License Number: 8223961
State Issuing Defendant's Driver's License: Utah
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DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ERNEST W.JONES, 1736
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-363-7900

Third Judk

iCOURT
District

APR 16 1999
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
AMENDED
INFORMATION

Plaintiff,
-vsRICHARD F. NORMS
DOB 5/15/55

Case No. 971008355FS

Defendant.
The undersigned Ernest W. Jones, Deputy District Attorney, under oath states on
information and belief that the defendant committed the crime of:
COUNT I
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.

'JVM

COUNT II
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT III
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of false
of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT IV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNTV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT VI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00„
COUNT VII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT VIII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT IX
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT X
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT XI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00,

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Officer Brook Plotnick, Officer Steve Humphrey, B. Gessel, Joan Mattson, Sue Hunter,
Kay Crosby, Mike Mabry, L. Stauffer, Kay Utley, S. Francis, O. Fowler, K. Noland, D.
Duffin and S. Labaron.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant bases this Information on police report no. 94-25376 and the following:
1.
During the spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisment in the newspaper.
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtaine djudgments against many of
these people.
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2.
The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to
fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to
cover up this scheme.

( / ^1^-Ar

ERNESf W. JONES
Affiant
Subscribed an<Lm£$fttyfl>|
day of April,

MAGISTRAL
Authorized for presentment and filing:
DAVID E. YOCOM, District Attorney

Deputy District Attorney
amended April 5, 1999
msw/97006614

xlii

00223

